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This thesis comprises three empirical studies examining topics in the field of innovation and 
technology management. These topics broadly concern firms’ practices of open innovation and 
their engagement in markets for technology. The first two chapters of the dissertation (co-authored 
with Said Matr) focus on the outbound type of open innovation, in a setting, where the firm makes 
its knowledge (or part of it) for free to the outside parties, and investigate its implications for the 
focal firm and the industry, respectively. More specifically, in the first chapter, we propose two 
channels, through which a firm can potentially capitalize on a decision of adopting an outbound 
open approach in its intellectual property (IP) strategy for no direct financial benefits in return. 
The first channel involves selling subsequent intellectual assets for the focal firm in markets for 
technology to meet the demand resulting from the increased engagement of third parties in the 
liberated knowledge. The second one refers to bringing the subsequent external knowledge in-
house via buying intellectual assets or building upon it internally. We capture the variation in 
IBM’s IP strategy toward more openness, using the decision of IBM to pledge 500 of its patents 
to the public in 2005. The results from implementing a difference-in-differences approach between 
1999 and 2010 provide support for the proposed mechanisms.  
The second chapter investigates the knowledge-domain-level consequences of a firm-level 
decision to open up its IP strategy, in terms of the amount and type of the innovations subsequently 
created, market structure characteristics, as well as trading activities in markets for technology. 
The results from a difference-in-differences analysis of the impact of IBM’s patent pledge of 2005 




field entities) file for patents, and more patent trades take place in the opened-up industries due to 
strategic openness. Our findings provide an empirical insight on the phenomenon of inside-out 
open innovation and improve our understanding with regard to its proclivity towards innovation 
advancement and innovation management at a broader level than the firm. Overall, among other 
contributions, these chapters establish a link between outbound openness and markets for 
technology at different levels of analysis.  
Finally, the third chapter (co-authored with Eduardo Melero and Kurt Desender) addresses the 
question of what mechanisms may help mitigate firms’ underutilization of external knowledge 
incorporation, and connects the literatures on markets for technology with the one on corporate 
governance to propose an answer. In particular, we focus on the widespread not-invented-here 
(NIH) syndrome, defined as a negative attitude toward outside knowledge that prevents 
organizations from absorbing external knowledge to generate further innovations, and argue that 
corporate-level actions can play an important role in neutralizing it. Accordingly, we examine the 
role of independent members of boards of directors, given their monitoring and advisory functions. 
We hypothesize and show that a higher presence of independent directors increases the probability 
of acquiring external knowledge in markets for technology, and that this relationship is particularly 
intense in settings where the NIH syndrome is more likely to be present. Furthermore, the effect 
is expected to be weaker when the CEO is in a strong position of power. Overall, our results 
confirm these hypotheses, suggesting that independent directors in corporate boards favor the 
incorporation of outside knowledge and help overcoming the NIH syndrome. 
This thesis has benefited from the financial support from FEDER (UNC315-EE-3636) and the 








Chapter 1   
What’s there to Gain? Outbound Openness 






Over the past years, the practice of outbound open innovation1 has become increasingly 
popular among big players in the software, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and automobile 
industries (West, Salter, Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 2014). Prominent examples are Johnson 
& Johnson’s innovation lab in La Jolla, California, IBM’s industry solution lab in Zurich 
Rüschlikon, or patent pledges of Red Hat (2002, 2017), IBM (2005), Google (2013), and many 
others. According to Linux Magazine, the 500 patents pledged by IBM “cost $10,000,000 to obtain 
(just in the U.S.) and are worth an unknown amount in licensing revenue”2. Interestingly, many 
such voluntary commitments to openness require no formal agreements to use the unlocked 
knowledge, meaning that outsiders can freely access it, without giving anything in return.  
Firms’ tendency toward making their knowledge or part of it available for free to outsiders (i.e. 
outbound open innovation3) in traditionally intellectual property (IP) intensive industries 
represents a “departure in strategy to say the least” (Fortune, 2016)4. Indeed, the conventional 
premise from the resource-based view strongly associates resource ownership with the ability of a 
firm to appropriate value (e.g. Barney, 1991; Collis & Montgomery, 1998). Thus, by granting free 
access to proprietary assets, thereby allowing for imitability, firms may risk losing competitive 
advantage over rivals (Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Then, why do corporate firms engage in 
                                                 
1 There are three main types of open innovation: outbound (inside-out knowledge flows), inbound (outside-in 
knowledge flows), and combined (both inside-out and outside-in knowledge flows) (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough 
2006a, 2006b). In this paper, we interchangeably use the terms outbound open innovation, outbound openness, and 
strategic openness to refer to the inside-out type of open innovation. 
2 http://www.linux-mag.com/id/1975/ 
3 In this study, by outbound open innovation we refer to the non-pecuniary type of outbound open innovation, 
following the definition by Dahlander & Gann (2010, p. 704), “This [non-pecuniary outbound] type of openness refers 
to how internal resources are revealed to the external environment. In particular, this approach deals with how firms 
reveal internal resources without immediate financial rewards…” The second, pecuniary type of outbound open 
innovation, distinguished by the authors, refers to dealing with external commercialization of internal inventions and 





outbound openness, especially without direct financial gains in exchange? In this paper, we suggest 
two main mechanisms that the firm may use to capitalize on its practice of outbound openness. 
These channels primarily concern strategic openness’ facilitating inward and outward knowledge 
flows, which in turn, induces the focal firm’s engagement in markets for technology, in terms of 
transactions for IP rights. This may give rise to potential externalities for the opening up firm. 
We complement to existing research that discusses possible incentives for firms to grant free 
access to their proprietary assets. These incentives comprise creating and obtaining returns from 
standards and their development (West, 2003; Henkel, 2006), advancing collective innovation 
(Levin et al., 1987), increasing the demand for their still proprietary assets that are complementary5 
to the opened-up ones and saving costs (e.g. Raymond, 1999; Alexy & Reitzig, 2013; Alexy, West, 
Klapper & Reitzig, 2018), or pursuing social goals (Raymond, 1999; Contreras, 2015). While these 
studies posit that other players in the market get more involved and contribute more to the opened-
up intellectual assets (e.g. Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017), to the best of our knowledge, there is little 
research on whether and how the focal firms capitalize on and incorporate the newly created 
knowledge by others into their innovation processes. According to the literature on competitive 
dynamics, firms consider the possible reactions from other actors in the market, when making 
important strategic decisions. Therefore, arguably, following the practice of strategic openness, 
the way they manage their innovation processes will subsequently be altered due to the increased 
involvement and knowledge availability from third parties.  
An important element in our theoretical arguments is that outbound openness reduces 
transaction and negotiation costs, as well as litigation threats (Wen, Ceccagnoli, & Forman, 2016). 
Due to the decrease in access costs and litigation risks, other firms get encouraged to become more 
                                                 
5 These are often “razor and blade” (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) or “hardware and software” type of complementarities 




involved (Boudreau, 2010) and subsequently build more knowledge. Further, the focal firm can 
respond to the advances in innovation in different ways: by selectively buying innovations that 
other firms have developed via relying on the liberated knowledge, or by making further internal 
developments through combining its expertise with the new knowledge created by others in a 
specific technology. At the same time, because strategic openness indirectly enforces the outsiders’ 
commitment to the liberated knowledge and technologies, as they create more complementary 
assets, thereby increasing their demand for the subsequent knowledge, the focal firm gets more 
opportunities for selectively selling its other internally developed knowledge. 
Our study makes use of IBM’s patent pledge of 2005 as a shock to the level of openness in the 
IP strategy of IBM (Wen et. al, 2016). Having the sample period from 1999 to 2010 allows us to 
implement a difference-in-differences approach to explore the consequences of the openness 
decision on the firm’s engagement in markets for technology and the degree to and channels 
through which IBM utilizes the follow-on spillovers. Our results show that after 2005, IBM buys 
and sells more patents, proportionally to the level of openness in its IP strategy. However, we find 
stronger evidence for increased selling, rather than buying activities by IBM. We also find that 
IBM continues to create further knowledge developments, building upon external sources of 
subsequent knowledge more than on its own subsequent knowledge.  
This study provides a new perspective on the firm’s decision to waive its exclusivity rights and 
uncovers an indirect mechanism that firms may exploit for potentially profiting from opening up, 
especially in the presence of a well-developed market for technology. Naturally, this advantage 
should be weighed against the potential negative effects in terms of competition that may be 




alternative when (in countries/technological areas) there are well-developed markets for 
technology allowing the firm to trade on the subsequently created knowledge. 
We contribute to the open innovation literature by providing a novel motivation and discussing 
potential indirect returns for the firms that adopt outbound openness pursuing no direct financial 
benefits. This link between open innovation and markets for technology has not been explored 
before, to the best of our knowledge. Put together, outbound open innovation could be viewed as 
complementary with trading in markets for technology. We also contribute to the literature on open 
innovation more broadly, by focusing on the effects of the outbound type of openness untangled 
from the inbound openness. While much of the prior research on open innovation has primarily 
focused on inbound open innovation, the outbound type of open innovation has received 
significantly less attention (Chesbrough, 2003). Importantly, however, our knowledge on the 
effects of inbound open innovation does not substitute that of outbound open innovation, and many 
studies have called for investigations on outbound open innovation effects (e.g. West et al., 2014). 
In this paper, we suggest that outbound openness is not necessarily something marginal in the 
firm’s technology policy, but an important stepping stone for the subsequent development of 
innovation. 
1.2  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
1.2.1 Closed and Open Models of Innovation 
Unlike in the traditional “closed” approach of innovation, where firms largely focus on in-
house research and development (R&D), whilst constraining outsiders from using their technology 
(Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000), in “open” innovation models, firms tend to employ fewer 




2003). In this paper, we focus on a setting of purely outbound open innovation practices, where a 
firm explicitly grants the proprietary rights of its technology to the public domain (Katz & Shapiro, 
1986; Boudreau, 2010). As patents or copyrights have long served as important mechanisms to 
protect firms from competitors by providing exclusive property rights for their innovations (Cohen 
et al., 2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001), without these rights, competitors, for instance, may be better 
placed in terms of their complementary assets or/and production facilities to utilize the opened-up 
knowledge by the focal firm (Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Therefore, one of the main challenges for 
firms practicing outbound open innovation is the risk of not being able to appropriate benefits from 
their decision (Helfat & Quinn, 2006). Nonetheless, firms are increasingly adopting openness in 
their innovation approaches, and therefore, we briefly discuss the prior literature on the motives 
for adopting strategic openness in the next subsection.  
1.2.2 Motives for Adopting Outbound Open Innovation 
We mentioned in the introduction some of the studies that extend the understanding of the 
underlying reasons why firms choose to open up their knowledge (e.g. von Hippel, 1998, 2005; 
von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; West, 2003; Henkel, 2006; Alexy & Reitzig, 2013; Alexy et al., 
2018). The theoretical premise from the previous literature is that opening up is not always 
detrimental for appropriating benefits from an innovation (von Hippel, 1998, 2005; Henkel, 2006; 
von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). Several works link openness with appropriation benefits in return 
from resource complementarities. For instance, primarily addressing the question of who opens up 
their knowledge, Alexy & Reitzig (2013) suggest that by doing so, firms can enhance the demand 
for their complementary resources controlled by the firm. In the context of open source software 
(OSS), Fosfuri, Giarratana, & Luzzi (2008) find that the possession of complementary assets 




complementary resources helps the firm to appropriate value from OSS development (Arora, 
1995), and gives the firm a bargaining power to reduce potential litigation risks from other entities 
against OSS products (Ziedonis, 2004). Building on the resource-based view, Alexy et al. (2018) 
provide contexts when openness can help/harm firms, their competitors or both. In particular, the 
paper argues that when the cost of production is high for an innovation and it is strongly positioned 
with complementary assets, the firm may decide to open it up and utilize those complementary 
assets to internalize the benefits from the opened-up knowledge.  
Other explanations for engaging in openness include the following. A study by Henkel, 
Schöberl, & Alexy (2014) suggests that firms’ deliberate waiving of some of their IP rights can be 
explained by the consumer demand pull for openness and that such behavior brings in a positive 
feedback loop, eventually making openness become another dimension of competition. Alexy, 
George, & Salter (2013) propose that firms may also engage in strategic openness to increase 
collaborative activities with others in the market. The authors argue that firms will be more prone 
to openness, especially when there is a high partner uncertainty, high coordination costs, and when 
potential known partners are unwilling to collaborate. Other reasons for which firms may decide 
to grant access to their proprietary knowledge include endorsing product interoperability via 
standards creation or pursuing social goals (Contreras, 2015). 
Though a common assumption in these studies is that outbound openness induces third parties’ 
involvement in the opened-up technologies, to the best of our knowledge, there is still little 
research that has focused on whether and how the firms that decide to open up, can internalize the 
involvement from other entities in their further innovation processes. Focusing on the effect on 
outsiders, Wen et al. (2016) analyze how strategic openness affects new product introductions by 




in areas of knowledge with higher rather than lower degrees of openness. Murray et al. (2016) find 
a positive impact of the level of openness associated with unlocked research tools on the 
subsequent innovations’ amount and type in a context of academic researchers. However, neither 
of these papers consider the consequences for the opening firm (IBM and Dupont, respectively) 
on its innovation strategy, which is key in this paper. 
One primary focus of this study is on how the level of openness in the IP strategy of a firm 
affects the opening firm’s participation in markets for technology. Hence, we further link the 
adoption of strategic openness to being on the supply and demand sides of markets for technology, 
following Arora & Gambardella (2010). 
1.2.3 Outbound Openness and Markets for Technology  
While developing new products and technologies is essential for survival and growth in today’s 
business environment (Swink, 2003), the possibility of purchasing technological assets can also 
provide firms with strategic flexibility to utilize on market opportunities (Cesaroni, 2004). Markets 
for technology, where inventors (organizations, individual inventors, etc.) trade knowledge assets, 
have grown substantially over the past decades (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; 
Chesbrough, 2003; Arora & Gambardella, 2010) and have received considerable attention from 
business and economics scholars, despite the general assumption of being underutilized. Prior 
literature provides mixed evidence on the relationship between markets for technology and IP 
protection (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). Some studies find a positive association (e.g. Arora, 
1995; Anand & Khanna, 2000; Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002), while other works find that weak or 
ineffective patent regimes are likely to increase trades in technology markets, or else, that IP 
protection has no effect on these markets (e.g. Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999; Smith, 2001; 




between outbound openness (i.e. explicitly giving up IP protection for some pieces of knowledge) 
and markets for technology. In the next section, we hypothesize on possible mechanisms through 
which the focal firm can capitalize on its practice of outbound openness, and Figure (1) depicts 
the hypotheses that we discuss in the following subsections. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.2.4 Internalization Mechanisms of Outbound Openness 
Selling in markets for technology. As a firm waives the proprietary rights to its technology, 
other players in the market are per se exposed to more “usable” knowledge6. Exposure to external 
knowledge sources increases the likelihood that other firms will seek to make use of the external 
knowledge (Huber, 1991), especially if the contribution is significantly large. This can be 
explained by the fact that the voluntarily liberated knowledge translates into decreased transaction 
and negotiation costs and litigation threats (Boudreau, 2010; Wen et al., 2016) for others, which 
encourages them to incorporate the opened-up knowledge into their internal innovation processes. 
If before, third parties had to pay royalty fees or else, buy the proprietary rights to incorporate it 
without infringing, now these entities can freely access and make use of this knowledge.  
To be able to exploit the liberated knowledge, outside actors are likely to create other 
supporting assets. These supporting assets can take the form of complementary downstream 
resources, as such resources related to manufacturing, marketing, or distributing the products that 
use the opened-up knowledge. This, in turn, will tend to increase third parties’ valuations of future 
                                                 
6 As patents are public, anyone can access the information provided in the patent. In this context, by “usable” 
knowledge, we mean that for the opened-up patent, the inventor is given the right to use the relevant knowledge 
without the need to pay any royalty fees. Additionally, the inventor is exempt from a litigation threat for using the 




inventions and further advancements of the opened-up knowledge. Consequently, the demand for 
the subsequent innovations based on the specific pieces of knowledge will tend to increase. In 
other words, as outsiders incorporate the opened-up knowledge into their internal innovation 
processes, by investing in complementary assets to support the knowledge usage and 
commercialization, they will tend to have a higher demand for related inventions. Hence, the focal 
firm practicing strategic openness, will obtain more opportunities for selling its other proprietary 
knowledge to outsiders7.  
Two main factors can help explain that the focal firm could indeed translate these increased 
selling opportunities into supplying the demanded pieces of knowledge following its practice of 
outbound openness. First, due to its prior experience with the opened-up knowledge, one could 
argue that the firm is naturally equipped with a stock of relevant knowledge, which would make it 
possible for the firm to satisfy the increased demand. Second, for the increased demand to be 
actually satisfied by the focal firm, the gains from selling opportunities would arguably need to 
exceed the costs from losing ownership and control over its other proprietary assets. As the 
probability of engaging in beneficial selling transactions would plausibly increase with higher 
demand and involvement from outside parties, in the hypothesis below, we expect the focal firm 
to sell more of its still-proprietary knowledge after the decision to open up. 
Hypothesis 1. The more openness the firm adopts in its IP strategy, the more knowledge it 
sells in the markets for technology.  
                                                 
7 Though outside the scope of the current study, the increase in the demand for relevant inventions will not necessarily 
only benefit the focal firm. Since outbound openness can also induce other firms to create their own advancements of 
knowledge (see further development of the hypotheses; and for a more detailed discussion, see Ayvazyan & Matr, 




Using the subsequently created knowledge via buying in markets for technology. Another 
logical reaction from outside parties to the reduction in the costs and risks of incorporating the 
liberated knowledge is to engage in creating subsequent developments8, for instance, by building 
upon it or/and by recombining it with their pre-existing stocks of knowledge. In the context of 
platform development, Parker & Van Alstyne (2017) argue that platform openness stimulates 
third-party developers to build upon the made-free knowledge and generate R&D spillovers. As 
others having diverse capabilities innovate and contribute to these opened-up technologies, the 
possibilities of knowledge recombination and new knowledge creation increase. Galasso & 
Schankerman (2015) document an increase in the follow-on inventive activities in the aftermath 
of involuntary waivers of exclusivity rights, i.e. patent invalidation decisions from the court. 
Despite the decision of patent invalidation, follow-on innovators are still required to recognize 
prior art, though now, without the need for paying any royalty fees (i.e. reduced costs for using the 
knowledge). Similarly, in the context of voluntary waivers of exclusivity rights (i.e. outbound 
openness), third-party engagement in advancing the liberated knowledge will tend to increase. 
The increased involvement from outside parties in developing new knowledge will be 
reinforced by the increased demand for the subsequent knowledge from those engaging in creating 
complementary assets, as a response to strategic openness (as hypothesized previously). From the 
focal firm’s point of view, the advancements of the liberated knowledge by others will, in turn, 
represent opportunities for internalizing these spillovers through two main channels. First, the 
focal firm could selectively buy from the new knowledge. Second, it could incorporate the further 
developments by building upon them within the limits of non-infringement of property rights. 
                                                 
8 Building complementary assets and engaging in creating further knowledge are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 





These two mechanisms (at least partially) can be explained through the lens of the concept of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Having the privilege of familiarity and a 
likely considerable experience with the previously proprietary knowledge, the focal firm will 
possess important absorptive capacities for identifying and evaluating the follow-on inventions 
(Arora & Gambardella, 1994). These abilities will facilitate the firm’s engagement in buying 
transactions of the subsequent external pieces of knowledge, which can potentially be more value-
enhancing in terms of their suitability with the firm’s innovative needs. In addition, being familiar 
and experienced in the liberated knowledge, focal firms would likely be equipped with the 
necessary complementary assets to be able to incorporate the outside knowledge into their internal 
innovation processes. These two factors, namely absorptive capacities and complementarities 
between internal and external knowledge are, in fact, two of the three main drivers of the demand 
side of markets for technology, as identified by Arora & Gambardella (2010). The third driver 
relates to the so-called “Not-Invented-Here” (NIH) syndrome, which largely refers to the irrational 
bias against outside sources of knowledge/technology. This syndrome may, at the extreme case, 
lead to an exclusively internal recombination of knowledge, thereby potentially putting the firm 
into a competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993). However, it is less 
likely to be dominant in firms that adopt open innovation approaches, since these firms are 
supposedly more “open-minded” towards outside-in or inside-out knowledge flows9. Thus, while 
absorptive capacities will tend to help the focal firm to identify and evaluate knowledge 
developments from third parties for buying decisions, the complementarities between internal 
knowledge and external knowledge advancements, together with a low propensity that the firm 
                                                 
9 See Cassiman and Valentini (2016) for a discussion on the complementarities between outbound and inbound open 




suffers from the NIH syndrome, will tend to mitigate the generally assumed underutilization of 
knowledge acquisitions in markets for technology.  
Taken together, the above-mentioned arguments support the premise that with strategic 
openness, the focal firm will get more opportunities for engaging in buying transactions in markets 
for technology. Hence, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2. The more openness the firm adopts in its IP strategy, the more knowledge it 
buys in the markets for technology. 
Using the subsequently created knowledge via building upon it. The second channel through 
which the firm may internalize the knowledge spillovers from the opened-up knowledge is via 
building upon these external knowledge advancements. This is especially relevant for situations, 
where directly incorporating others’ follow-on knowledge with the help of the firm’s 
complementary assets via buying in markets for technology (see the discussion above) is likely 
not an optimal choice for the firm. For instance, with the increased availability of subsequent 
knowledge due to outbound openness, it is possible that some of this externally developed 
knowledge is simply not yet commercializable and further technical developments are still 
required to ultimately take the knowledge to market. Considering that the focal firm can use its 
absorptive capacities of identifying and evaluating external pieces of knowledge from the pool of 
sequential inventions (due to its existing experience and know-how with the liberated knowledge), 
with increased available knowledge, the firm will be provided with new possibilities for further 
recombining and advancing the technology without infringing on others’10.  
                                                 
10 Importantly, the newly created knowledge by the focal firm should be sufficiently differentiated from and not 
infringing on others’ inventions. Otherwise, the risks and costs of infringement could cancel out the potential benefits 




Prior research has argued that building upon the subsequent technical developments for 
generating new knowledge is, in fact, beneficial for the focal inventing firm, as it may allow for 
capitalizing on the firm’s previous inventive efforts (Belenzon, 2012). The intuition behind is that 
by “reabsorbing” the subsequent knowledge, the firm may mitigate the potential negative effects 
of (involuntary) knowledge spillovers11 and sustain its long-run earnings. Then one could argue 
that building on the follow-on knowledge would be especially important, when practicing 
outbound openness, where the firm itself allows for knowledge spillovers. This is the case, since 
with more involvement from others in creating developments of the opened-up knowledge, the 
competitive environment becomes more dynamic, increasing the need for the focal firm for 
developing and renewing prevailing capabilities to match the changing requirements of the 
environment (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). The increased “competition” anticipated by the 
firm’s adoption of outbound openness implies that the firm should protect its market position and 
continuously develop new knowledge to be able to compete in these fields. Thus, as illustrated in 
Figure 2, we argue that the increased subsequent inventive output due to outbound openness would 
lead to more opportunities for the firm for internalizing those externalities. Hence, our third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. The more openness the firm adopts in its IP strategy, the more knowledge it 
builds upon the subsequently created knowledge.  
1.3  RESEARCH SETTING 
Studies on knowledge transfer among firms and on innovation have relied on the outcomes of 
technology licensing transactions (e.g. Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fosfuri, 2006; Nagaoka & 
                                                 




Kwon, 2006; Gambardella, Giuri, & Luzzi, 2007) or collaborations (e.g. Singh, 2005; Schilling & 
Phelps, 2007; Jugend et al., 2018). We argue that these proxies do not allow disentangling the 
effect of outbound open innovation for the following reasons. Firms engaging in licensing or 
collaborations remain in control, at least partially, of the flow of knowledge in terms of who can 
use the knowledge or how often they can use it. Specifically, in case of licensing, the firm chooses 
to whom to license, while getting royalties in return. On the one hand, this naturally limits the 
number of users, who can benefit from the knowledge, and on the other hand, the firm still holds 
the ownership of the knowledge. Similarly, in case of a collaboration, the firms remain the owners 
of the knowledge, and the knowledge flows in both directions, as the collaborating firms make 
their knowledge available to each other. As a result, the effect of outbound and inbound openness 
appears combined and separately undistinguishable.  
We deviate from these studies, by testing our hypotheses in a different setting, namely patent 
pledges. Specifically, our research context is IBM’s IP strategy and its consequences for 
innovation-related outcomes for IBM itself during the period from 1999 to 2010. In 2005, IBM 
announced that it had decided to donate 500 of its patents to the public in support of the 
development of the OSS community. Being royalty-free, IBM’s patent pledge did not require any 
formal agreement for anybody to use the patents in the pledge. This means that anybody could use 
the opened-up knowledge without, for instance, a requirement of giving up their own IP rights. 
These properties make the setting of IBM’s pledge a pure form of outbound openness. In addition, 
IBM made the decision of pledging these patents considering their substantial economic 
importance, as well as their ample coverage of technological classes. According to Linux 




amount in licensing revenue”12. IBM’s patent pledge announcement (2005) claimed that that patent 
pledge was by far the biggest contribution to the OSS, in terms of the number of patents. The 
announcement (2005) also stated that “Fostering Innovation, Interoperability and Open Standards” 
were the goal of the pledge. 
Nevertheless, several alternative motives behind IBM’s pledge have been discussed in various 
academic and non-academic sources. For instance, IBM pledge was suspected to be motivated by 
the dispute between IBM and Santa Cruz Operation (SCO) Group in 2003, where IBM was accused 
of infringing SCO’s UNIX code (Goettsch, 2003). After its counterclaim against SCO in 2004, 
IBM decided to offer the 500 patents in the pledge for free, arguably, to provide the OSS 
community with insurance about Linux, the open-source operating system IBM supported. 
Meanwhile, Alexy & Reitzig (2013) note that the patent pledge could have been reasoned to 
stimulate the demand for IBM’s complementary assets and the sales of its hardware products. 
Another speculation regarding this pledge refers to the debate about European software patent 
laws. Some observers doubted that IBM’s move was aimed at signaling to the European legislators 
that software patents did not necessarily hinder the innovation process. Altogether, we argue that 
these speculations do not seem to be directly related to IBM’s strategy in markets for technology. 
Thus, IBM pledge appears to be a suitable context to address our research question. 
1.3.1 Identification Strategy 
Empirically, we perform difference-in-differences analyses incorporating IBM’s pledge of 
2005 at two different levels. The first set of analyses includes the level of knowledge domain, 
represented by technological classes, according to The United States Patent Classification (USPC). 





We use these class-level analyses (with class-year type of observations) to explain the temporal 
variation outcomes of patent trading (i.e. selling and buying) activities (for hypotheses 1 and 2), 
using a score of openness for each technological class. To understand the construction of this score 
(see “Independent Variables” subsection), we next explain our identification strategy at this level. 
First, we identify the treated group of technological classes, if the class includes any of the 500 
patents that IBM pledged in 2005. There are 50 such technological classes. The classes without 
any pledged patent, to which IBM had significantly contributed up until 2005 – that is IBM patents 
counted for more than 2.5% of all the patents in the class or IBM had more than 200 patents in the 
class13 - serve as the control group of technological classes. There are 127 control classes, leaving 
us with 177 classes in total. Assigning an openness score to each of these technological classes 
allows us to explore whether IBM tends to buy or sell more patents in areas of knowledge in related 
to their levels of openness. 
In the second set of analyses, we use data at the patent-level (with patent-year observations). 
The goal of these analyses is to track the effect of the patent pledge on patent trading in a more 
detailed and direct manner and to test the impact on building upon the subsequently created 
external knowledge (Hypothesis 3), by examining the pledged patents and their spillovers, e.g. 
citing patents, in comparison to similar non-liberated patents and the latter’s spillovers. In these 
difference-in-differences analyses, we compare the pledged patents, i.e. treated group, to a selected 
group of similar patents, i.e. control group, which we construct by matching each pledged patent 
with other patents using a text matching algorithm to measure technological similarity, following 
Arts, Cassiman, & Gomez (2017). We ask for a minimum similarity score of 15% and require the 
control patents to have the same filing year and to belong to the same technological class. 
                                                 
13 The choice of the 200 patents allows us to avoid losing technological classes that have a substantial absolute number 




Eventually, we are left with 1351 patents in the control group with an average of about three control 
patents for each patent in the pledge14. These treated and control patents represent the “Initial” 
patents illustrated in Figure 2. 
For each group (i.e. treated and control), we extend the number of patents by considering their 
spillovers, which we capture with “Level-one” and “Level-two” patents (see Figure 2). To do so, 
we draw on prior studies that argue for the proximity between citations and knowledge flows, 
despite possible noisiness15 (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 2000; Duguet & MacGarvie, 2005; 
Gay & Le Bas 2005), and use initial treated and control patents’ forward citations to proxy related 
knowledge flows (i.e. spillovers). Importantly, we differentiate between direct and indirect 
citations received by the initial patents. A patent that cites any of the initial patents (treated or 
control) represents a direct citation. We refer to this patent as level-one patent. Accordingly, 
depending on whether the level-one patent cites the pledged patent or a control patent, we consider 
it as treated or control, respectively. Further, a patent that cites the patent citing any of the initial 
patents (level-one patent) represents an indirect citation. We refer to this patent indirectly citing 
an initial patent as level-two patent (Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the discussion 
above)16. This distinction between level-one and level-two patents is especially relevant for testing 
our third hypothesis, where we look at whether an external patent (i.e. a patent that was not created 
by IBM) is more likely to be cited by IBM (level-two) if that patent (external level-one) has built 
                                                 
14 Note that there are duplications in the control patents for the treated patents (i.e. two different pledged patents can 
share the same control patent). 
15 The noisiness of this measure (using forward citations to capture knowledge flows) is mostly related to the fact that 
during the patent application process, citations from patent examiners, who are responsible for checking for prior art, 
may be added to the original references in the patent application. However, citations are still a valid empirical proxy, 
especially in industries, where knowledge creation is cumulative, and are widely used in extant related literature.  
16 Although intuitively, indirect citations are not limited to only level-two patents (they can include patents at level 
three and more), for methodological reasons associated with the data characteristics, we consider only up until the 
patents in the second level. However, we believe that this restriction should not distort our results, as the higher the 
so-called level of the citation, the farther and less related, in principle, the newly created knowledge from the original 




upon any of IBM’s pledged patents after 2005. As for Hypotheses 1 and 2, we test for whether 
being related to the pledge (level-one or level-two patents in the treated group), increases the 
likelihood of being traded by IBM. Not surprisingly, then, in the analyses related to Hypothesis 1 
(selling) at the patent-level, we limit the sample to only IBM patents. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.3.2 Pledged patents 
Before we turn to data description and results discussion, we further examine the differences 
between the pledged and control patents (at the initial level), to corroborate the suitability of our 
empirical exercise. In their study on the effect of IBM 2005 patent pledge on new product 
introductions, Wen et al. (2016) compare the patents in IBM’s pledge to a randomly selected group 
of similar patents in the market and conclude that the pledged patents have, in general, similar 
backward and forward citations, and that the pledged patents have lower number of claims. 
Similarly, they compare the pledged patents to other IBM patents, and find that the pledged patents 
have similar forward citations, but lower backward citations (indicating lower derivativeness) and 
lower claims (indicating narrower scope). In the current study, we compare the patents in the 
pledge (500 patents) to the control group (1351 patents). Table 1 presents our own tests of the 
differences between the treated and control groups in terms of the following observables: Forward 
citations, Forward citations up to 2005, Backward citations, Non-patent references, Claims, and 
Independent claims. Both groups of patents seem to have received a similar number of Forward 
citations and Forward citations before 2005 and they both seem to have relied on a similar number 
of references. On the other hand, the patents in IBM’s pledge seem to use more non-patent 




group has a higher number of claims, similar to Wen et al. (2016), and a higher number of 
independent claims, which indicates a wider scope of knowledge. Overall, this evidence also rules 
out the argument that IBM could have pledged patents that were not valuable17.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.4  DATA AND METHODS 
1.4.1 Data 
To build the variables related to patent trading (i.e. selling and buying) activities, we rely on 
the Patent Assignment Dataset (PAD) from the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) website (www.uspto.gov). Importantly, unlike licensing or alliance transactions, most 
patent ownership transfers are recorded by parties with the database, since legally, for the 
(re)assignment to be considered as legally binding18, it has to be filed with the USPTO. A typical 
transaction includes information on the buyer and the seller, the dates of recording, executing or 
signing, the number of patents/patent applications transacted per assignment, and the assignment 
type (Marco et al., 2015). Although the majority of the reassignments constitute an inventor-to-
employer transfer of rights, we mainly consider inter-firm assignments of patents, as the latter are 
more reflective of markets for technology. Other types of patent reassignments that we do not 
consider as a buying or selling activity include name correction, government interest, and name 
                                                 
17 Similar to the patent-level comparisons, Ayvazyan & Matr (2019) compare the treated and control groups in terms 
of the amount of patents by IBM and the total number of patents in the technological classes and do not find any 
drastic differences in the trends before 2005. 
18 Marco et al. (2015) note that whether the recorded transfers accurately represent the population of the assignments 
remains an open question, since it is not mandatory to record the transfer of patent rights at the USPTO. However, 
interested parties do have incentives to record an assignment with the USPTO, as only those patent transfers that are 




change of the assignee. Since the assignee names are not disambiguated in the Patent Assignment 
Database, we follow the name standardization procedure from the NBER patent data project19 to 
identify possible IBM transactions. Finally, after identifying the bought and sold patents, we are 
able to link these data with other relevant data on patent characteristics from the USPTO database 
PatentsView20 that we use to construct our independent and control variables. This data is 
disambiguated for patents, inventors, assignees (firms/individual inventors). 
1.4.2 Empirical Model 
For the class-level analyses, we run the regressions under the specification of a linear estimator:  
Yjt = α + β Opennessjt + δ Opennessjt * After 2005j +𝝁 ∗ 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒋𝒕 +  uj +µt + εjt,, 
where j indicates the technological class, and t indicates time. For the error components, uj 
indexes a technological-class-specific effect and εjt is an idiosyncratic error term. Our baseline 
regressions take the relevant trading intensity as dependent variables (Yjt). We regress these 
variables on the degree of openness of IBM in the corresponding technological class, as measured 
by the class’ presence in the patent pledge. To capture the extra effect of the decision of opening 
up this knowledge, we interact the openness measure with a dummy variable for the years from 
2005 to 2010. This approach involves a difference-in-differences with a non-dichotomous 
treatment variable (Openness) and dichotomous time variable (After 2005). In order to accurately 
estimate the precision of the regression coefficients, we cluster the standard errors at the level of 
the treatment assignment, technological class level. Since the variable Openness is time invariant, 
adding it as an explanatory variable is equivalent to adding the group means of this variable as a 
separate predictor. This approach is similar to the correlated random effects approach of Mundlak 
                                                 
19 Available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject. 




(1978). Moreover, we add to the model year fixed effects to control for the time trends in a flexible 
manner. 
We use an analogous setting for the patent level analysis, where the openness measure is 
captured with a dichotomous indicator (Pledge-Related Patent21) denoting if the focal patent cites 
any pledge patent, directly or indirectly. In these patent-level analyses, we use a difference-in-
differences design with dichotomous treatment group and dichotomous treatment time and with 
standard errors clustered at the patent level. 
1.4.3 Dependent Variables 
IBM Selling Class and IBM Buying Class. We build these variables for our class-level analyses 
(see Identification Strategy subsection above), to account for patent acquisitions in a specific 
technological class in a specific year. As noted previously, when identifying patent acquisitions, 
we exclude within-firm reassignments of rights – recorded reassignments from an inventor 
employee to an employer assignee (Employee Assignments) or reassignments due to changes in 
the assignee name or name corrections –, in addition to agreements of governmental interest. By 
verifying whether IBM is on the buying or selling side of the patent trade, we determine the number 
of patents sold or bought in each of the transactions, and then aggregate these values per year at 
the technological-class level. Hence, IBM Selling Class (IBM Buying Class) represents the total 
number of patents that IBM sold (bought) in a specific technological class in a given year. In some 
analyses, we also include the variable IBM Trading Class, which we create by summing up the 
yearly bought and sold patents by IBM per technological class, to account for the firm’s aggregate 
participation in markets for technology. 
                                                 




IBM Selling patent and IBM Buying patent. In the analyses at the patent level, our dependent 
variables related to the participation in markets for technology, are (binary) dummies that simply 
record whether IBM bought or sold the focal patent in a given year.  
Citations from IBM. We build the variable Citations from IBM at the patent-level to test our 
third hypothesis. This is a yearly measure, counting the number of citations made by IBM to level-
one patents. To construct this variable, for each level-one patent in a given year, we simply 
aggregate the total citations received from IBM. 
1.4.4 Independent Variables 
Openness. As remarked in our empirical model, the effect of outbound openness at the 
technological-class level, is captured by the interaction term between an openness measure, 
Openness, and the dummy After 2005. The variable Openness, represents the claims-weighted 
count of the pledged patents in each of the technological classes22. Weighting these patents by their 
number of claims, rather than simply using patent counts, allows us to better reflect on the 
scope/breadth of the opened-up knowledge in technological classes (Allison, Lemley, Moore, & 
Trunkey, 2004; Novelli, 2015). Accordingly, the technological classes without any pledged patents 
obtain a value of zero in their openness score.  
Pledge-related Patent. To account for “openness” in our patent-level analyses, we create the 
(binary) dummy variable Pledge-related Patent, which indicates whether the patent is a level-one 
or level-two citation to any of the initial 500 pledged patents. In some cases (for Hypothesis 3), 
                                                 




we specify Pledge-related Level-one Patent to refer to the level-one pledge-related patent (i.e. 
taking a value of 1 if the level-one patent is pledge-related, and 0 otherwise).  
In Table 2, we describe all the variables used in our analyses at both levels. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.5 RESULTS 
1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for selected variables at the class level appear in Panel A in Table 3. For 
our sample period between 1999 and 2010, we have 1969 class-year observations belonging to 
177 technological classes, in total, 50 out of which were to some extent opened up due to IBM’s 
pledge in 2005. The average Openness score in our panel data is 80.5 claims and the maximum 
score is 2184 claims. On average, IBM files for 118 patents yearly in the average technological 
class with a maximum of 2020 patents in a class. The average technological class has 19045 patents 
yearly from all the firms in the market. From the same class in the same year, IBM buys slightly 
more than 11 patents, on average, while it sells around 24 patents. In Panel A in Table 4, we present 
the statistical correlations between our main variables at the technological class level. 
Analogously, Panels B in Tables 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix, 
respectively, for the main variables at the patent level.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 





Further, we provide some simple and preliminary statistics, exploring the differences between 
the pledge-related patents that IBM sold and bought in our sample, to get some initial insights on 
the characteristics of the patents in IBM’s trading decisions. We compare these two groups of 
patents, 549 sold and 453 bought patents, in terms of observables, like patent’s Forward Citations, 
Backward Citations, Non-patent References, and Independent Claims (see Table 5). While the 
forward citations received by the bought patents seem to be higher than the ones received by the 
sold patents, in terms of the backward citations, both groups seem to be statistically similar. The 
two groups seem to be statistically similar also in terms of the number of the independent claims, 
indicating that these patents seem to have similar breadths/scopes. More interestingly, the 
difference in Non-patent References is extremely statistically significant, where, on average, the 
bought patents have higher numbers of non-patent references. In later analyses, we notice that the 
buying probability increases when the patent has more non-patent references, yet the opposite 
happens for the selling probability in the corresponding model (see Table 7). 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The pre- and post-trends of IBM’s participation in markets for technology, in terms of patent 
buying and selling activities in opened-up (treated) versus close (control) technological classes are 
shown in Figure 3. This figure suggests that IBM’s decision to open up its IP strategy was 
associated with an increased buying and selling tendencies in the opened-up technological classes. 
Arguably, the figure provides a preliminary support for the use of difference-in-differences 
analyses in our empirical approach, pointing out at acceptably similar pre-treatment trends for both 
variables of interest. Interestingly, one can note that the association between IBM patent trading 




by the time that may be needed for the pledge to facilitate a market creation, which will in turn 
enable IBM to buy (sell) subsequent inventions from (to) others. In other words, time is needed 
for the demand and supply of technology to be developed so that IBM can internalize the 
externalities of its strategic openness. Our additional analyses (see Results section below) formally 
test for this effect over time. Taken together, these graphs suggest that IBM’s trading in markets 
for technology experienced a boost after the firm’s decision to adopt outbound open innovation, 
as proxied by employing the 2005 patent pledge.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.5.2 Class-level Results 
We begin with investigating how the aggregate trading activities of IBM are associated with 
the variation in its strategic shift toward openness. Then, we study how IBM Selling Class or IBM 
Buying Class change with the openness level. Table 6 reports the main results for this part of the 
analysis. The positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term in column (1) in Table 6 
suggests that additional 100 claims in an opened technological class are associated with 3.7 extra 
traded patents, either bought or sold, in that technological class after the pledging time, year 
200523. Column (2) indicates that the total number of patents sold by IBM after 2005 in affected 
technological classes, increases by 1.6 patents with each additional 100 claims contributed to the 
pledge. Analogously, the third column shows that the number of patents that IBM buys also 
increases with the firm’s outbound openness. More specifically, IBM buys 0.4 patents per class 
with an increase of 100 claims to the openness of the technological class. The second and third 
                                                 
23 Considering that each pledged patent includes, on average, 16.72 claims, this numbers imply that, on average, one 




models point at the direction that IBM gets more involved in trading activities, in general, after its 
decision to waive its exclusivity rights of its intellectual assets. However, IBM seems to be keen 
on selling more patents in comparison to buying patents. In relative terms, a one-standard-
deviation increase in Openness leads, on average, to a 0.053 (80×0.016/24) standard-deviation 
increase in selling and a 0.03 (80×0.004/11) standard-deviation increase in buying after 2005. 
These findings provide support for our Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.5.3 Patent-level Results 
To investigate the effect of the patent pledge on IBM’s behavior in markets for technology in 
a more direct way (for the first two hypotheses), we conduct patent-level analyses, where we check 
for the likelihood of a patent being sold or bought by IBM (IBM Selling Patent or IBM Buying Patent), 
depending on whether or not the patent is related to the pledge. We construct two different samples 
of patents to study the buying and selling possibilities separately. The sample for testing the 
probability of buying consists of both the level-one and level-two patents (both the pledge-related 
and control patents). For the analysis of the probability of selling, we build the sample from IBM’s 
level-one and level-two (both treated and control) patents. The effect of interest is represented by 
the interaction term between the dummies Pledge-related Patent and After 2005. We control for 
citations received by the patent (Forward Citations), since that can be a signal of quality and 
potentially can increase the probability of being traded. Other controls are Backward Citations, 
Non-patent References, and Independent Claims, which can account for the patent scope and value. 
In addition, we control for the total number of patents IBM files in the focal patent’s technological 




significantly more inclined to sell patents that are related to the pledge. The probability of IBM 
selling a patent increases after 2005 by 0.02% for the pledge-related patents. Column (4) shows 
that being related to the pledged patents does not seem to affect the probability of being bought by 
IBM. Overall, the results presented in Tables 6 and 7 give a strong support for our first hypothesis 
and a partial support for the second one.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
To test Hypothesis 3, which states that the focal firm internalizes the knowledge created by 
other players through building upon it, we analyze the effect on Citations from IBM to level-one 
patents before and after the practice of strategic openness. To do so, we first identify the pledge-
related and the corresponding control group of level-one patents (Pledge-related Level-one 
Patent), after which we simply distinguish between whether or not the level-one patent belongs to 
IBM (Non-IBM Level-one Patent). The idea behind these classifications is to allow for empirically 
testing whether IBM will build upon the external subsequent knowledge more, in comparison to 
its own subsequent knowledge, which we will be able to capture by interacting the dummies 
Pledge-related Level-one Patent, Non-IBM Level-one Patent, and After 2005. Table 8 comprises 
a three-way interaction approach with the corresponding two-way interaction terms. We are 
particularly interested in the coefficient of the interaction term between Level-one Pledge-related 
Patent and the After 2005 dummy, as well as in the three-way interaction term. The first of these 
two coefficients of interest is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that IBM depends 
less on its own level-one pledge-related patents after 2005 in comparison to non-pledge-related 
ones (i.e. level-one control patents). More interestingly, the three-way interaction is significantly 




liberated knowledge more than it uses its own subsequent knowledge. Taken together, these results 
provide evidence to confirm our third hypothesis positing that the opening up firm will draw on 
the knowledge others create using its opened-up knowledge.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.5.4 Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
The potential confounding effect of OIN. In 2005, IBM, Novell, Philips, Red Hat, and Sony 
launched the Open Invention Network (OIN) with the aim to advance Linux and other OSS 
programs. To become a member of this network, firms are required to offer their patents for 
royalty-free licenses and agree not to assert their own patents against the Linux innovators. The 
patents that OIN acquires from the outsides are also offered royalty-free to the members. This way, 
OIN’s goal is to create a collaborative ecosystem, a patent-non-aggression community and protect 
its members from litigation and other types of patenting risks (OIN official website24). Since both 
the creation of OIN and IBM’s patent pledge took place in 2005, and both events represented a 
liberation of knowledge for the OSS community, one could argue that the results presented earlier 
in the paper could be driven by the launch of the shared defensive patent pool, OIN, rather than 
IBM’s pledge. Therefore, it is reasonable to address the potential confounding effect of the OIN’s 
establishment on IBM’s internalization strategies after 2005.  
In order to do so, we follow a similar approach used for our (original) Openness measure and 
create the variable OIN Openness at the class level, to capture the knowledge scope/breadth 
liberated by OIN in each of the technological classes. More specifically, this measure indicates the 





claims-weighted patent count of OIN patents related to a technological class j. While OIN owns 
more than 1300 global patents, we only consider the 660 patents registered at the USPTO when 
constructing our proxy. 
To disentangle the impact of the OIN launch from IBM patents’ pledge, we run the main 
analyses with incorporating OIN Openness. In particular, in models (1), (3), and (5) in Table 9, we 
examine the effect of OIN Openness isolated from IBM’s pledge, while in models (2), (4), and (6), 
we consider both events simultaneously. We perform these analyses for the main variables of 
interest regarding IBM’s trading activities. The results show that the effect of the patent pledge is 
robust to accounting for the impact of OIN liberated patents. In models (1), (3), and (5), OIN 
openness seems to have no effect on the number of patents IBM sold, bought, or traded, 
respectively, after 2005. More importantly, the effect of Openness on the variables of interest in 
models (2), (4), and (6) does not seem to change when considering OIN openness, which provides 
additional evidence that the 2005 patent pledge influences the changes in the firm’s behavior in 
markets for technology and its effect does not seem to be mixed with the effect of OIN launch. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The development of the openness effect over time. During our sample period, IBM did not 
add to the 500 patents in the pledge after 2005, which means that the shock was unstaggered and 
concentrated in the few years after 2005. To study the development of the effect of IBM’s pledge 
over time in more details, we break down the effect over the years following the firm’s decision. 
In our sample, there are five years after the announcement of the patent pledge, 2005-2010, with 
the first (second) block of analysis being the years 2006 and 2007 (2008 and 2009), and the last 




interact with the openness measure. We do this to reflect on the concentration of the effect of 
openness, in terms of the closeness from the shock. The results in Table 10 show that the effect of 
the patent pledge on the variables of interest related to trading is concentrated in the second block, 
years 2008 and 2009. Overall, these results may suggest that the impact of openness takes some 
time to show up in the firm’s patenting and IP trading activities and fades away after a few years. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Economic effects. To get further insights on the economic effect of the patent pledge, we 
investigate the intensity of IBM’s inventive activities, as proxied by the number of patents filed by 
IBM, and its ability to create radical inventions, proxied by the number of radical patents. To 
construct the latter variable, we follow Eggers & Kaul (2018) measure of radicalness. Both of these 
aspects can help quantify the economic returns to adopting an open IP strategy, as these have been 
positively linked to firm value, firm future earnings, etc. (e.g. Mitchell, 1989). The results in Table 
11 show that IBM experienced an increase in its inventive output in the technological classes, 
proportionally to their degree of openness. Analogously, the radicalness of IBM’s patents also 
increased after the firm’s decision to open up its IP strategy. An increase in a specific technological 
class openness by 100 claims is associated with an increase in the number of patents produced by 
IBM by 9.64 patents and 0.8 more radical patents after the firm’s shift toward openness in 2005. 
This positive association between the adoption of an open IP strategy and the number of total 
patents and the number of radical patents can be an indicator of firm’s value and its future earnings 
(Mitchell, 1989; Bessen, 2009). 
-------------------------------------------------------- 






Our paper sheds light on a new possible angle for investigating a firm decision to allow for 
inside-out knowledge flows for no direct financial benefits, i.e. strategic openness, prominent 
examples of which are patent pledges by various multinational giants. This behavior seems to 
contradict the traditional management theories that emphasize the role of ownership and protection 
of intellectual assets in ensuring value appropriation from the firm’s innovation. In this paper, we 
study certain actions of a firm after its adoption of outbound open innovation, in order to improve 
our understanding of possible internalization mechanisms. Mainly, we claim that the firm can 
capitalize on the externalities resulting from its decision to grant free access for its knowledge to 
the outsiders through two channels. The first channel involves selling intellectual assets in markets 
for technology to meet the hypothesized demand resulting from the increased engagement of third 
parties in the liberated knowledge. The second one refers to bringing the subsequent external 
knowledge in-house via buying intellectual assets in markets for technology or building upon them 
internally. We test our hypotheses using IBM’s pledge of 500 patents to the OSS community in 
2005 during the period 1999-2010. Our results suggest that IBM exploited the markets for 
technology options in the research lines related to the liberated knowledge after its shift toward 
outbound openness via selling intellectual assets. In addition, IBM seems to have kept valuing the 
subsequent knowledge in the opened-up fields created by others, evidenced by increased building 
on external patents and by increased involvement in buying transactions of patents in markets for 
technology.  
Overall, this study contributes to the literature on open innovation by investigating how firms 
may internalize on their practice of (non-pecuniary) outbound openness through the proposed two 




markets for technology. While prior research has proposed that outbound openness may trigger a 
demand boost in the firm’s complementary assets (e.g. Alexy et al., 2018), in this paper, we show 
an augmented demand for the firm’s other relevant knowledge, which can be met through markets 
for technology. However, one should also analyze the costs of this practice and the forgone 
opportunities that the firm could achieve if it did not decide to involve in this practice. Such costs 
and opportunities can be related to potential licensing revenues the firm could make or possible 
benefits from blocking potential competitors from using its knowledge.  
Our study is subject to limitations. As we empirically examine the effect solely for IBM, the 
external validity of this study is limited, which means that one should be careful when 
implementing our findings in different contexts and for other firms. Nevertheless, we believe that 
studying a firm as big as IBM is still useful as a case from which other firms can learn. IBM is a 
big firm that provides a great variety for aspects to be explored and other firms thinking of adopting 
openness can infer a lot from it. These findings are expected to be more relevant and beneficial for 
firms with substantial resources and capabilities that allow them to employ the suggested 
mechanisms, especially in the markets for technology. Another related limitation for our study 
could be linked to the fact that we do not observe heterogeneity in terms of factors, such as firm’s 
size and capabilities, financial and intellectual, which may be essential when deciding to open up 
the firm’s IP strategy. Next, one other factor that we cannot account for due to our empirical 
setting, is the timing of openness adoption (e.g. earlier adopter vs follower) and how it could 
change the dynamics of our mechanisms. These could provide opportunities for future research. 
Finally, we assume that openness in one area of knowledge has no impact on the effect of openness 




dependent on each other at different degrees, one can think of considering the interactions among 






Table 1: Tests of the differences between the treated and control groups of patents. 
Note: The column “Difference” represents the value from subtracting the mean of the control group from the treated 











Min Max Mean 
(SE) 
Min Max Mean 
(SE) 
Forward Citations 39.900 
(6.230) 
1 357 36.621 
(1.449) 
1 540 3.278 
(2.771) 
Forward Citations up to 2005 38.685 
(6.032) 
1 341 35.356 
(1.435) 
0 540 3.328  
(2.733) 
Backward Citations 9.900 
(0.994) 
1 56 12.249 
(0.469) 
1 263 -2.349 
(1.210) 
Non-patent References 3.510 
(1.263) 
0 177 2.723 
(0.204) 




1 57 19.583 
(0.359) 
1 120 -2.859*** 
(1.341) 
Independent Claims 3.594 
(0.323) 
1 17 3.905 
(0.073) 





Table 2: Variable descriptions. 
Variable name Variable description (all variables are yearly measures) Level of 
analysis 
Dependent variables Data source: Patentsview.org (patents, citations), USPTO 
(reassignments) 
 
IBM Buying Class Number of patents IBM buys in a given technological class. Class 
IBM Selling Class Number of patents IBM sells in a given technological class. Class 
IBM Trading Class Number of patents IBM buys or sells in a given technological 
class. 
Class 
IBM Total Patents Class Number of patents that belong to IBM in a given technological 
class. 
Class 
IBM Rad. Patents Class Number of radical patents (following Eggers & Kaul (2018)) 
that belong to IBM in a given technological class. 
Class 
IBM Buying Patent A level-two patent that is bought by IBM. Patent 
IBM Selling Patent A level-two patent that is sold by IBM. Patent 
Citations from IBM Number of citations each level-one patent receives from IBM. Patent 
Independent variables Data source: Patentsview.org (patents, citations)  
Openness Summation of the claims of the patents that were pledged by 
IBM in a given technological class in 2005. 
Class 
After 2005 1 if the (application) year (of the patent) is after 2005, 0 
otherwise. 
Both 
Total Patents Class Number of patents in a given technological class. Class 
Number of Patenting Firms 
Class 
Number of firms that patent in a given technological class. Class 
Pledge-Related Patent Pledge-related level-one or level-two patent (binary). Patent 
Pledge-Related Level-one 
Patent 
Pledge-related level-one patent (binary). Patent 
Non-IBM Level-one Patent 1 if the level-one patent does not belong to IBM (binary). Patent 
Patent age The difference between the application year and the given 
year. 
Patent 
Forward Citations Number of forward citations received by the patent.  Patent  
Backward Citations Number of backward citations made by the patent.  Patent  
Claims Number of claims of the patent. Patent 
Independent Claims Number of independent claims of the patent. Patent  
Non-patent References Number of backward citations made by the patent to 
references that are not patent. 
Patent 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the main variables at the class and patent levels. 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A.  Class-level 
Openness 80.560 267.172 0 2184 
IBM Total Patents Class 118.294 225.438 1 2020 
IBM Selling Class 24.043 72.601 0 2468 
IBM Buying Class 11.280 22.466 0 511 
Total Patents Class 19045.890 18759.940 35 96356 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 288.825 274.233 1 1639 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
B.  Patent-level 
IBM Buying Patent 0.0004 0.020 0 1 
IBM Selling Patent 0.0005 0.023 0 1 
Forward Citations  22.980 45.442 1 1083 
Backward Citations 35.423 53.281 1 500 
Non-patent References 10.627 17.676 0 100 
Claims 23.717 16.924 1 539 
Independent Claims 3.737 2.744 0 136 
Note: Panel A includes the descriptive statistics of the variables defined at the class level. The number of class-year 
observations is 19,045. Panel B includes the descriptive statistics of the variables defined at the patent level. These 
statistics consider both the level-one and level-two patents. IBM Buying Patent and IBM Selling Patent are binary variables. 






Table 4: Correlation matrix for the main variables at the class and patent levels. 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 A. Class-level 
1 Openness 1       
2 IBM Total Patents Class 0.374 1      
3 IBM Selling Class 0.025 0.101 1     
4 IBM Buying Class 0.225 0.240 0.184 1    
5 Total Patents Class 0.157 0.661 0.192 0.383 1   
6 Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.118 0.354 0.153 0.395 0.843 1  
a 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 B. Patent-level 
1 IBM Buying Patent 1       
2 IBM Selling Patent 0.165 1      
3 Forward Citations  -0.005 -0.006 1     
4 Backward Citations -0.006 -0.008 0.096 1    
5 Non-patent References -0.005 -0.008 0.056 0.540 1    
6 Claims 0.003 0.000 0.149 0.102 0.120 1  
7 Independent Claims -0.001 0.001 0.103 0.023 0.038 0.450 1 
Note: Panel A includes the correlations between the variables defined at the class level. Panel B includes the 
correlations between the variables defined at the patent level. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 5: Comparisons between the pledge-related bought and sold patents by IBM. 
VARIABLES 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy 
Forward Citations 24.290 30.320 34.690 57.150 1 1 265 800 
Backward Citations 16.880 47.290 18.070 62.030 1 1 234 323 
Non-patent References 5.610 27.290 16.700 71.190 0 0 355 360 
Independent Claims 3.620 3.790 2.340 2.490 0 1 22 20 
Note: This table provides the preliminary statistics of the patents that IBM bought and sold during the sample period. 







Table 6: IBM’s total traded patents and total bought and sold patents in each technological class. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES IBM Trading Class IBM Selling Class IBM Buying Class 
Openness 0.154 0.103*** 0.018 
 (0.257) (0.010) (0.011) 
After 2005 -0.340* 0.280 -0.305 
 (0.138) (0.698) (0.241) 
After 2005 x Openness 0.037*** 0.016** 0.004*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.001) 
Total Patents Class (×1000) 0.540 -0.096 0.006 
 (1.150) (0.087) (0.031) 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.003* -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) 
IBM Total Patents Class -0.015 0.007 0.015 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) 
Year and Tech. class FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.834*** -0.669 0.281 
 (0.620) (0.618) (0.247) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 1,969 
Number of Tech. classes 177 177 177 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the class-level analyses under the specification of a random-effect 
linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the technological class level are presented in brackets. All 






Table 7: The effect of being related to the pledged patents on the probability of IBM selling or 
buying. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES IBM Selling Patent IBM Selling Patent IBM Buying Patent IBM Buying Patent 
Pledge-Related Patent  0.035***  0.005*** 
  (0.003)  (0.000) 
After 2005  -0.086***  -0.004*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Pledge-Related Patent x After 2005  0.008**  0.0001 
  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Forward Citations (×1000) 0.488*** 0.268*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.003) (0.003) 
Backward Citations (×1000) 0.029*** -0.075*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent Claims (×1000) 1.950*** 1.110*** 0.004 -0.006 
 (0 200) (0. 193) (0.046) (0.047) 
IBM Total Patents Class (×1000) -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-patent References (×1000) -0. 361*** -0. 265*** 0.007** 0.006** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.006*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year and Tech. class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 181,794 181,794 263,215 263,215 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the patent-level analyses under the specification of a random-effect 
linear estimator. The sample in columns (3) and (4) consists of IBM patents only, hence, the difference in the number 
of observations. Robust standard errors clustered at the patent level are presented in brackets. All variables are defined 






Table 8: IBM citations to the patents created using the pledged patents (level-one patents). 







Pledge-related Level-one Patent  0.060 -0.030 
  (0.039) (0.066) 
Non-IBM Level-one Patent  -0.034 -0.147*** 
  (0.039) (0.053) 
After 2005  0.0261 0.281** 
  (0.069) (0.126) 
Pledge-related Level-one Patent x Non-IBM Level-one Patent   0.194** 
   (0.082) 
Pledge-related Level-one Patent x After 2005   -1.088*** 
   (0.162) 
Non-IBM Level-one Patent x After 2005   -0.039 
   (0.148) 
Pledge-related Level-one Patent x After 2005 x Non-IBM Level-one Patent    0.958*** 
   (0.203) 
Patent Age 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Forward Citations (×1000) 7.430*** 7.430*** 7.430*** 
 (0.746) (0.746) (0.747) 
Backward Citations (×1000) 6.910*** 6.890*** 7.000*** 
 (0.276) (0.277) (0.277) 
Independent Claims (×1000) -2.720 -2.780 -3.120 
 (5.940) (5.940) (5.940) 
Non-patent References (×1000) 7.430*** 7.430*** 7.430*** 
 (0.746) (0.746) (0.747) 
Year and Tech. class FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.948*** 1.932*** 1.984*** 
 (0.088) (0.097) (0.099) 
Observations 48,051 48,051 48,051 
Number of level-one patents 16,773 16,773 16,773 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the patent-level analyses under the specification of a random-effect 
linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the patent level are presented in brackets. All variables are defined 








Table 9: The effect of IBM’s patent pledge when considering the effect of OIN patents. 














Openness  0.009***  0.004  0.013** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
OIN Openness  -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
After 2005 x Openness  0.003**  0.003*  0.005** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
After 2005 -0.089 -0.181* -0.052 -0.145 -0.142 -0.325* 
 (0.080) (0.096) (0.067) (0.100) (0.138) (0.179) 
After 2005 x OIN Openness 0.001* -0.0004 0.001 -0.007 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Total Patents Class (×1000) -0.023 -0.021 0.030 0.032 -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.023) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
IBM Total Patents Class 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
Year and Tech. Class FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.0772 0.0425 -0.226 -0.106 -0.304 -0.0631 
 (0.109) (0.0967) (0.190) (0.132) (0.293) (0.215) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,969 
Number of Tech. classes 177 177 177 177 177 177 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the class-level analyses under the specification of a random-effect 
linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the technological-class level are presented in brackets. All 





Table 10: The development of the openness effect over time after the pledge. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IBM Selling Class IBM Buying Class 
Openness -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Years 2006&2007 x Openness 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Years 2008&2009 x Openness 0.006*** 0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Year 2010 x Openness -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Patents Class (×1000) -0.028 0.017 
 (0.031) (0.015) 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
IBM Total Patents Class 0.002 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Year and Tech. Class FE Yes Yes 
Constant 0.109 0.0558 
 (0.091) (0.093) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 
Number of Tech. Classes 177 177 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the class-level analyses under the specification of a random-effect 
linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the technological-class level are presented in brackets. All 





Table 11: IBM’s total patents and total radical patents in each technological class. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IBM Total Patents Class IBM Rad. Patents Class 
Openness 0.960*** 0.018*** 
  (0.082) (0.006) 
After 2005  -12.450* -1.618*** 
  (7.342) (0.593) 
After 2005 × Openness 0.096*** 0.008** 
 (0.037) (0.003) 
Total Patents Class (×1000) -6.170*** 0.102*** 
 (1.190) (0.033) 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.426*** -0.005** 
 (0.010) (0.002) 
IBM Total Patents Class  0.064*** 
  (0.006) 
Year and Tech. Class FE Yes Yes 
Constant 8.537 0.890* 
 (8.456) (0.475) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 
Number of Tech. Class 177 177 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the class-level analyses under the specification of a random-effect 
linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the technological-class level are presented in brackets. All 






Figure 1: Consequences of the focal firm’s adoption of outbound openness. 
 
Note: This figure summarizes the three hypotheses developed in the paper.  
 
Figure 2: Illustration for the levels of patents.
 
Note: This figure depicts the discussion on the use of the pledged 500 patents for the construction of treated and control 
groups for patent-level analyses. The matching procedure is performed at the initial step, where we match the pledged 
patents (i.e. treated) with a randomly selected group of non-pledged patents that comply with certain criteria (i.e. 
control), according to textual similarity scores between the pledged and non-pledged patents’ abstracts, their 
application years and technological classes. In the next two steps, we create “Level-one” and “Level-two” patents, 
according to the citations received to the pledged (or pledge-related, i.e. the left side of the figure) and initial control 
(or initial-control-related; the right side of the figure) patents.   
  
Level-two Patent
a) Citing Level-one Patent Citing the Pledged Patent b) Citing Level-one Patent Citing the Control Patent
Level-one Patent
a) Citing the Pledged Patent b) Citing the Control Patent
Initial Patent




Figure 3: Average Number of Patents Bought/Sold by IBM from 1999 to 2010 for the Treated vs 
Control Technological Classes. 
Note: A technological class is considered as treated (control), if it includes (does not include) a patent that was opened-
up by IBM in 2005. In addition, the control group of technological classes is restricted to those, where IBM had 
patented in significantly before 2005. IBM class buying (selling) represents the average number of patents bought 









Chapter 2  
How Outbound Open Innovation Strategies 
Affect the Subsequent Innovation Process in 







Recently, the prevalence of open innovation has increased as a model for organizing firm’s 
innovation processes. As emphasized by Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West (2006, p.1), “open 
innovation is the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal 
innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively”. Much of the 
previous literature on the topic has focused on the “outside-in” knowledge flows (i.e. “inbound 
open innovation”), studying advantages and disadvantages of using external knowledge sources 
on such organizational outcomes, as firm performance (Kafouros & Forsans, 2012), innovation 
performance (Laursen & Salter, 2006), or new product introductions (Rubera, Chandrasekaran, & 
Ordanini, 2016). Yet, practicing open innovation also implies pecuniary or non-pecuniary “inside-
out” knowledge flows (i.e. “outbound open innovation”), where the firm sells or reveals its 
proprietary knowledge to the outside world (Dahlander & Gann, 2010).  
Despite the relatively low level of attention received so far from scholars (West & Bogers, 
2014), the latter type of outbound openness, where firms do not seek for direct financial benefits, 
has become a subject of growing interest among researchers, given its seemingly counterintuitive 
nature and the increasing number of practices (e.g. patent pledges, granting access to specific 
research tools, etc.) in various industries in recent years. Not surprisingly, many of the works on 
the non-pecuniary outbound openness have tried to explain its determinants and the potential firm-
level consequences (e.g. Levin et al., 1987; West, 2003; Alexy & Reitzig, 2013; Contreras, 2015; 
Alexy et al., 2018; Matr & Ayvazyan, 2019), whilst discussing channels of appropriation from 




at a more aggregated level than the firm, the knowledge domain level25. And these “systems” (i.e. 
fields of knowledge), in which firms are embedded, are likely to be affected, with the switch 
toward more freely accessible knowledge available for external actors (West, Vanhaverbeke, & 
Chesbrough, 2006). 
Aiming at filling in this gap, in this paper, we study the consequences of a firm decision to 
adopt non-pecuniary outbound openness in its intellectual property (IP) strategy (henceforth, 
outbound openness26) on the innovation amount and type subsequently generated, market structure 
characteristics, and on markets for technology. In particular, in addition to asking (i) whether more 
knowledge is subsequently created, we ask whether (ii) more radical knowledge is developed, (iii) 
more participants innovate in or enter the opened-up knowledge fields, and whether (iv) more 
trading activities occur in the markets for technology. These are all closely relevant questions, the 
analysis of which at the level of the knowledge area, can improve our understanding of the strategic 
value of outbound open innovation in terms of its proclivity towards innovation advancement and 
innovation management. Empirically, we test our hypotheses for the sample period of 1999-2010 
via a “difference-in-differences” approach, utilizing the patent pledge of IBM in 2005 as a shock 
for outbound openness. In this pledge, IBM made 500 of its patents covering various fields of 
knowledge available for free to the Open Source Software (OSS) community and assured not to 
pursue anyone for the usage of the opened-up knowledge for infringement (IBM announcement, 
2005).  
Our findings suggest that the larger IBM’s contribution to the knowledge fields is (i.e. the 
higher the level of “openness” of the knowledge fields is), the more knowledge, thereafter, is 
                                                 
25 We further relate our study to two of the papers that do provide a discussion on the topic: Wen et al. (2016); Murray 
et al. (2016). 
26 “Outbound open innovation”, “outbound openness”, “strategic openness”, and “inside-out open innovation” are 




created in these domains and that this new knowledge tends to be more radical in nature. The 
plausible cause behind the surge in generating new knowledge is related to the increased demand 
for further knowledge developments and the reduction in the access costs due to outbound 
openness (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003; Boudreau, 2010; Wen et al., 2016; Matr & Ayvazyan, 2019). In 
the same vein, our results support the conjecture that openness encourages other entities to get 
more involved in the opened-up areas of knowledge, which, in turn, gives rise to more possibilities 
for knowledge recombination, hence, more radical knowledge creation (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Fleming, 2001; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Jung & Lee, 2016). The trend, however, is channeled 
through an increase in the involvement of existing actors, since the number of new contributors 
into the knowledge field does not seem to be significantly altered. We explain this finding from 
the perspective of the need of having certain “absorptive capacities” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 
1990; Zahra & George, 2002) to be able to develop on the opened-up knowledge. Finally, we show 
that transactions of intellectual assets in the markets for technology increase proportionally to the 
level of openness in the areas of the liberated knowledge, pointing to a greater reliance on external 
technological solutions for (at least) some industry players. We build on the argument that 
outbound openness likely reduces the uncertainty of the commercial value of the liberated and 
related technologies, through a combination of increased inventive output and increased 
engagement from market actors in developing follow-on knowledge. 
The main contribution in this paper is to provide an empirical insight on the phenomenon of 
inside-out open innovation, by considering its repercussions for the innovation-related outcomes 
in the knowledge domains. At this level of analysis, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical study linking the literature on open innovation with that on markets for technology27. 
                                                 
27 While Matr & Ayvazyan (2019) link these two streams of literature at a firm-level analyses, we explore the 




Overall, our evidence suggests that openness in the knowledge fields may facilitate the 
specialization of the technology suppliers (West et al., 2016) and stimulate the knowledge markets, 
as supported by the increased number of contributors to developing knowledge internally and of 
buying transactions of externally developed knowledge. This may ultimately improve the match 
between innovations and firms that lies at the heart of the paradigm of open innovation research 
(Chesbrough, 2003). 
Our study also complements the findings of two pieces of related recent work. One of them is 
Wen et al. (2016) showing that following the practice of strategic openness, start-up firms 
introduce more new products. Though we draw on the authors’ empirical context to capture the 
levels of openness (i.e. utilizing IBM’s patent pledge), rather than focusing on the 
commercialization aspect, in the present paper, we establish a positive link of the pledge with the 
knowledge creation facet, evidenced by a subsequently increased inventive output in the opened-
up knowledge domains. Thus, an implication of the current study could be relevant for regulators 
and policy makers to consider promoting firms to practice outbound openness as a means to boost 
inventive activities in knowledge domains. Another set of our results is comparable to the ones 
from Murray et al. (2016), who analyze the consequences of outbound openness in a setting of 
academic researchers, mainly biologists, in pharmaceutical fields. The authors hypothesize and 
find that lowering access costs to existing research tools encourages scientists to create more 
knowledge and explore more novel research directions28. However, there are two main differences 
between Murray et al. (2016) and our study. First, our empirical setting is distinct in terms of the 
                                                 
28 Murray et al. (2016) empirical context includes the National Institutes of Health agreements with DuPont in the late 





industry (pharma vs software) and the type of the innovations (academic vs corporate29) in focus. 
Second, though our findings are similar in regard to the amount and type of the inventive output, 
the subtle difference is that we observe an increase in the quantity of radical inventions in the 
opened-up knowledge fields, while Murray et al. (2016) find that new lines of research are created 
due to openness. This may also explain the finding from our study that outbound openness in our 
context does not attract actors that do not have previous experience in the liberated fields of 
knowledge (new-to-the-field actors). Altogether, these differences emphasize the value added by 
studying the effect of openness in firm’s IP strategy at the knowledge domain level. 
2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The premise of this paper is that the switch from a traditional closed IP strategy, - where a firm 
highly relies on internal R&D processes and tends to protect its knowledge from the outsiders by 
various means, - toward outbound open innovation may have implications not only for the firm 
engaged, but also for the systems that the firm is part of, such as networks, sectors or industries 
(West et al., 2006). The scope of our research includes (a) the non-pecuniary type of outbound 
openness, - defined as the flows of knowledge or resources from the inside to the outside 
environment, where the firm does not pursue direct or immediate financial benefits (Dahlander & 
Gann, 2010), - and (b) the area of knowledge to which the opened-up knowledge belongs. In the 
following subsections, we link openness in the knowledge domains to innovation-related outcomes 
of interest, and illustrate the relationships in Figure 1. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                 
29 The academic innovations in Murray et al. (2016) are captured by the citations received from researchers or 




2.2.1 The Effect of Outbound Openness on the Subsequent Innovations and 
Market Structure 
Inventive output and inventing participants. The first relationship that we consider is the one 
between openness and the subsequent inventive activities in the knowledge fields. Prior studies 
postulate that by lowering the costs of entry for outside parties, openness encourages their 
involvement to the opened-up knowledge fields, thereby driving more innovative output. Consider 
the case of an external party that is well equipped with (or can develop) complementary 
downstream resources that can help with commercializing the opened-up knowledge. For this 
market player, the transaction costs of identifying or acquiring the otherwise proprietary 
knowledge, the potential costs of inventing around or infringing on that knowledge would 
decrease, with more knowledge freely available due to outbound openness. For instance, Wen et 
al. (2016) posit that these cost reductions induce new product introductions by startups in the 
opened-up knowledge fields. Arguably, then, with more involvement from such innovators, the 
demand for further knowledge in the area will increase.  
Now, consider the case of an external party that is keen on developing technology. On the one 
hand, with more knowledge revealed or made freely available in the knowledge field, these market 
players will encounter less constraints for advancing the opened-up pieces of knowledge. On the 
other hand, the reduced barriers may contribute to the emergence of a dominant design (Boudreau, 
2010), which can ultimately affect the future of the knowledge field (Bower & Christensen, 1995). 
Therefore, for technology developers, engaging in the opened-up knowledge domains may also 
become a strategic necessity for keeping their competitiveness. Taking into account this, together 
with the potentially increased demand in the field for related knowledge, in their study on the 




& Ayvazyan (2019) assume that the amount of follow-on inventions and external parties involved 
in the opened-up areas of knowledge will also tend to increase. However, the authors do not 
provide an empirical examination of the link. And despite the positive evidence from other 
contexts, as such, the pharmaceutical industry (Murray et al., 2016) or platform openness (Parker 
& Van Alstyne, 201730), we believe that it is essential to empirically test whether the effects would 
also hold in the setting of a purely outbound open innovation. Overall, the intuition behind the 
reduced incorporation costs and the arguments related to the increased demand for inventive output 
lead us to hypothesize that more participants will invent in the opened-up fields and more 
knowledge will be created in those fields: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more openness introduced in the area of knowledge, the more 
knowledge is created in that area of knowledge. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The more openness introduced in the area of knowledge, the more 
participants invent in that area of knowledge. 
New-to-the-field participants. The next logical step is to understand whether the increase in 
the number of participants comes from new-to the field entrants versus existing firms in the 
industry. Noteworthy to mention that exposure to external knowledge is not a sufficient condition 
for a firm to benefit from it. Because of the cumulative nature of the innovation process and the 
need for specific resources and capabilities to be able to transform new inventions into 
                                                 
30 Parker & Van Alstyne (2017) introduce a sequential innovation model for innovation decisions that a platform 
holder may face, particularly, how much open the platform should be and how long it will take for follow on 
innovations to fold back into the platform. In the model, the platform sponsor seeks to receive benefits from developers 
in return to giving away internal resources. These benefits come in the form of royalties that developers have to pay 
and eventually owning innovations that are built by them (the developers eventually lose their innovations). Overall, 
the authors argue that openness in platforms stimulates third-party developers to build upon the opened up knowledge, 
even in the presence of royalty fees and losing their IPs. In contrast, the concept of pure outbound openness implies 
that developers (innovators) do not need to pay royalties or give up the innovations that they build using the opened 
up knowledge. Given this, we expect that outbound openness is likely to encourage other market players to build upon 




commercializable outcomes, not every actor in the market would promptly start inventing and 
contributing to the innovation output in a new-to-the-firm domain. Cohen & Levinthal (1989, 
1990) are the first to define the concept of absorptive capacity (AC) as a firm’s “ability to recognize 
the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends”. Zahra & George 
(2002) review the AC concept and differentiate between two types of absorptive capacities: 
potential AC and realized AC, which separate the acquisition and assimilation components of the 
construct from the transformation and exploitation ones, respectively. They state, “Exposure to 
diverse sources does not necessarily lead to PACAP [potential AC] development, especially if 
these sources have low knowledge complementarity with the firm” (Zahra & George, 2002, p.193). 
From the findings of increased number of product introductions from startups (Wen et al., 2016), 
one could expect that the number of new-to-the-field participants would also increase. However, 
since new product development represents the commercialization part of the innovation process, 
we speculate that it is related to the realized AC. Meanwhile, knowledge creation would arguably 
require more science-related capabilities, which makes it more associated with the potential AC. 
In other words, the firm needs an existing know-how in the field in order to be able to use the 
liberated technologies to create new knowledge. Therefore, we anticipate that a firm without an 
existing set of absorptive capacities will be less willing or less able to get involved in the areas of 
liberated knowledge, if these knowledge fields are unknown to the firm31. Taking into account 
these arguments, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The more openness introduced in the area of knowledge, the 
proportion of new-to-the-field out of total participants decreases. 
                                                 




Radical innovations. The seminal work by Schumpeter (1934) emphasizes the role of 
innovation in bringing in economic change and surviving in an increasingly competitive milieu. 
Especially relevant is the role of radical innovations in firm survival and economic growth 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Schumpeter, 1934). Radical 
innovations, together with incremental innovations constitute the two main types of innovations, 
classified by innovation literature (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997). These innovations differ 
in their degree of novelty in technology, require different capabilities for creation and 
implementation, and have different consequences for firms (Dewar & Dutton, 1986). In contrast 
to incremental innovations, which introduce minor changes in existing technology (Damanpour, 
1991; Munson & Pelz, 1979), radical innovations represent major departures from current practice 
(Duchesneau, Cohn & Dutton, 1979; Ettlie, 1983; Dewar & Dutton, 1986). While the chances of 
success are not high in the case of radical innovations, the rewards are substantial in case of 
success, in comparison to incremental innovations that require less effort, but lower rewards in 
terms of performance implications (Schumpeter, 1942; Marsili & Salter, 2005). At a broader level, 
radical innovations that often require large investments in R&D, may result in new products, 
change the market structure or even create new markets (Levinthal & March, 1993). We further 
hypothesize whether or not the exposure to more knowledge for outside parties via outbound 
openness, may translate into more radical or incremental knowledge creation in the field. 
The usage of external sources may facilitate firms to combine and create various technologies 
and new knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Dependent on how intensively firms draw on 
external sources of innovation, they may create innovations with different degrees of novelty. 
Laursen & Salter (2006)32 suggest that firms’ relying deeply on a few external sources of 
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innovation favors radical innovations. Meanwhile, relying broadly, yet less intensively, on a 
greater number of external sources of knowledge favors incremental innovations. Connecting the 
concept of outbound openness to the depth of knowledge, we argue that the more a firm opens up 
in a specific area of knowledge, the more deeply others have the opportunity to draw upon that 
knowledge. To put it differently, with more knowledge liberated in an area of knowledge, a firm 
has the possibility to rely more intensively on this specific area of knowledge. Hence, we expect 
that more radical innovations will be created in a knowledge field due to strategic openness. 
Further, on the one hand, radical innovations naturally involve a high level of uncertainty and 
complexity, which increases the need for more information and actors involved in the innovation 
processes (Murray et al., 2016; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Not surprisingly, the complexity and 
uncertainty inherent to radical innovations are also associated with increased lead-time necessary 
for their development (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1999). On the other hand, as we hypothesize, 
outbound openness increases the chances of getting more participants involved in creating 
knowledge, via reducing access costs. This, in turn, allows for more possibilities for knowledge 
recombination. Following the logic from innovation recombination scholarship (Fleming, 2001; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Jung & Lee, 2016), combining new knowledge 
with existing knowledge leads to the generation of more radical inventions. Finally, as argued by 
O’Connor (2006), outbound openness may also facilitate the processes and reduce the time 
necessary for radical innovation development. Thus, given the availability of more freely 
accessible information, commitment from more inventors and shortened time required for 
invention, due to strategic openness, the latter is likely to contribute to more radical knowledge 
creation in the field. Hence, we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): The more openness introduced in the area of knowledge, the more 
radical knowledge is created in that area of knowledge. 
2.2.2 The Effect of Outbound Openness on the Markets for Technology 
Markets for technology are well known for providing firms with the possibility of acquiring/in-
licensing externally developed or selling/out-licensing internally developed knowledge assets. The 
effect of the strength of IP protection has been argued in some studies to lead to more transactions 
in markets for technology, while other studies have argued for the opposite effect on activities in 
these markets (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). In this subsection, we view knowledge liberation as 
a means of relaxing IP protection, and hypothesize that, paradoxically, it leads to an increase in 
trading in technology markets. 
Arora & Gambardella (2010) claim that, in addition to information asymmetries and 
moderating transaction costs, the uncertainty about the commercial value of a technology plays a 
significant role in the demand for the technology. We expect that the uncertainty in the value of 
technology will decrease in the presence of outbound openness, through increased inventive output 
and number of contributors in the area of knowledge. Reasonably, an increasing number of 
inventing firms in a specific field may signal an attractive business opportunity with lower risks. 
Therefore, for inventors that prefer technology outsourcing to in-house technology development, 
as a faster and safer way to innovate and market a technology (Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999), there 
are more possibilities for exploiting the “buy” option in more open knowledge fields. This becomes 
feasible as outbound openness arguably fastens the innovation processes and increases the number 
of participants. Another argument is related to the proposition that outbound openness encourages 
(at least some) outsiders to carry on more R&D activities. Considering that opening up offers 




boosting their in-house R&D activities, and the premise that in-house R&D helps firms to benefit 
from external knowledge (Escribano, Fosfuri, & Tribó, 2009), we expect outbound openness to 
also indirectly increase the demand for external knowledge sources. Empirical evidence provides 
support for this notion, indicating that in-house R&D facilitates the replication of knowledge (Tsai, 
2001), and assists firms in benefiting from external knowledge (Escribano et al., 2009). 
On the supply side in the markets for technology, Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella (2004) claim 
that technology markets are generally characterized with less competition, in comparison to 
product markets. We expect that with even higher competition in the downstream product markets 
due to outbound openness (e.g. Wen et al., 2016), certain groups of inventors, especially the 
technology specialists, using Arora & Gambardella (2010) terminology, will be encouraged to 
invent technologies in order to sell them in the technology markets (as hypothesized above). 
Consequently, we expect that the effect of strategic openness on the technology market size is 
positive: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The more openness introduced in the area of knowledge, the more 
trading activities of intellectual properties takes place in that area of knowledge. 
2.3 RESEARCH SETTING 
To investigate the effects of outbound openness on a field of knowledge in terms of the 
subsequent knowledge characteristics and its production patterns, the structure of contributors, and 
trading activities, we exploit IBM’s significant shift toward openness in the IP strategy through its 
patent pledge of 2005, as an exogenous shock for the openness of the knowledge domains. 
Accordingly, we track the relationships of interest before and after 2005 for the period 1999-2010. 




pieces covered by 500 software patents to the community of OSS. Despite the fact that various 
other events before 2005 could be argued to have facilitated the switch from a traditional closed 
to an open innovation regime at IBM (e.g. taking the initiative to create the software Apache or 
the integrated software development community Eclipse), this patent pledge was considered to be 
by then the biggest commitment to the OSS community in terms of inside-out knowledge flows. 
The patents in the pledge covered a variety of software markets, allowing us to have a sufficient 
amount of heterogeneity in the openness levels of the knowledge fields for observing changes in 
the outcomes of interest over time. In addition, given that the estimated cost of patenting typically 
ranges around $20000 for a U.S. patent, the monetary value of the pledge could reach about $10 
millions. Before proceeding to the description of data, sample and variable construction methods 
using the 500 pledged patents, we briefly discuss two main reasons for why IBM’s pledge provides 
an appropriate context for testing our hypotheses. 
Our first argument is related to the plausible exogeneity of IBM’s pledge for the outsiders in 
our empirical exercise. Since we are interested in the implications of the pledge for the knowledge 
fields (with higher versus lower levels of openness), rather than IBM itself, we argue that the 
probability that the external players could have anticipated this decision is fairly low. Prior 
research that used this shock to measure openness at both the firm (e.g. Matr, 2019; Matr & 
Ayvazyan, 2019) and industry levels (Wen et al., 2016), has thoroughly discussed the motivations 
behind the pledge. Among other motives, the latter has been linked to IBM’s competition with 
Microsoft, the lawsuit against Santa Cruz Operation (SCO) Group, and favoring the patentability 
of software inventions in Europe. Therefore, for the purposes of our paper, utilizing this pledge to 




concerns. To further strengthen our effects and rule out other possible similar concerns, we repeat 
all our analyses, excluding IBM’s patents from the samples (see section Results). 
The second reason for why we believe that IBM’s pledge represents a suitable context for our 
main analyses, is related to the selection of the patents in the pledge. Since the construction of our 
so-called treated and control groups of knowledge domains depends on the pledged patents, it is 
essential to assure that the differences between these groups are minimal. To that end, in their 
study, Wen et al. (2016) performed comparisons according to certain observable patent 
characteristics between the 500 patents from the pledge and two other sets of patents. Comparing 
first with a group of patents from IBM’s patent portfolio and then with non-IBM patents from the 
market, the authors conclude that the pledged patents did not entail drastic differences in terms of, 
for instance, forward and backward citations, and claims. Similarly, in Matr & Ayvazyan (2019), 
we compare the patents in the pledge to a set of other patents that we chose based on textual 
similarity in the patents’ abstracts, and confirm that the pledged patents seemed to be similar to 
their comparable patents in terms of characteristics, such as forward and backward citations, non-
patent references, claims, and independent claims. Overall, these observations suggest that the 500 
liberated patents were financially valuable and fairly similar to their analogous patents. More 
importantly, the comparisons at the knowledge domain level presented in the next section are in 
line with the intuition that the current research context is appropriate for addressing the questions 
raised in this study. 
2.4 DATA AND METHODS 
We perform our main analyses at the knowledge domain level, represented by technological 




analyses the temporal variation in outcomes, such as the innovation output, innovation radicalness, 
new-to-the-field entries to the area of knowledge, and knowledge trading activities, using the 
openness level of the knowledge field. In total, each model comprises 177 classes, out of which, 
50 classes include the pledged patents and represent our treated group. The classes without any 
pledged patent form the basis of our control group, which is defined by the classes, in which IBM 
had been active before 2005 and in which it could potentially have opened up some of its IP (Matr 
& Ayvazyan, 2019). In particular, we require significant contributions from IBM to these classes 
prior to 2005 in the form of having more than 200 patents or having a share of 2.5% of all the class 
patents. The comparisons between the treated and control technological classes in terms of the 
number of patent applications made solely by IBM (indicating IBM’s inventive efforts in the field) 
and the ones made by all the firms in the class (indicating inventive activities in the field) are 
presented in Figure 2. This figure shows fairly similar before-2005 trends for the two groups of 
technological classes, which suggests that IBM does not seem to have chosen to pledge patents in 
fields of knowledge that were characterized with higher or lower inventive activities or in areas 
which IBM did not prioritize or was lowering its inventive efforts. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
To build our measures for innovation process characteristics, we use the patent and citation 
data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database from PatentsView 
(www.patentsview.org), which is disambiguated for patents, inventors, assignees (individual 
inventors or firms). Furthermore, we utilize the Patent Assignment Dataset (PAD) from USPTO 
website (www.uspto.gov) to build variables related to the trading activities of patents. PAD 
includes all reassignment activities in the patent data due to different reasons. Mainly, we consider 




the markets for technology more accurately than other types of assignments. The majority of the 
reassignments are employer assignments, which are an inventor-to-employer transfer of rights, and 
we do not consider them as trading activities. Name correction, government interest, and name 
change of the assignee are other types of patent reassignments that we exclude from our sample.  
2.4.1 Variables 
Dependent variables. We construct the variables Total patents class, Total assignees class, Total 
traded patents class, by aggregating the number of patents, assignees (i.e. participants), and traded 
patents, respectively, per technological class per year. The variable New-to-the-field entrants class 
(%) represents the ratio between those assignees that have not patented in the technological class 
up until the given year and the total number of assignees in the class. As for accounting for the 
radicalness of the subsequently created patents, we follow Eggers & Kaul (2018) method and 
create the variable Radical patents class. This measure considers patents that are novel and that can 
potentially create radical technology. By novel, we refer to “new-to-the-field” inventions, and not 
“new-to-the-firm” ones. These inventions reflect what prior literature has called “unprecedented 
combinations” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Rodan & Galunic, 2004), meaning that they draw upon 
knowledge that no or few inventors have used in the technological field prior to the year of 
invention. Empirically, we compare each patent’s backward citations (indicating the existing 
knowledge that the patent builds upon) to the citations of all the other patents that are filed in the 
same technological class, in order to ultimately track how potentially “new” the focal patent’s 
knowledge recombination is. We then assign a score of radicalness to each of the patents and create 
a binary dummy variable for whether the patent’s score is above the 90th33 percentile, following 
                                                 




the steps from Eggers & Kaul (2018)34. Finally, at the class level, for each technological class, we 
build Radical patents class, taking the summation of the binary values in the class. 
Openness. To build our independent variable, following the method from Wen et al. (2016) 
for constructing the measure “Commons,” we first count the number of claims of the patents 
(indicating knowledge score/breadth) that were pledged by IBM in 2005. Then, at the 
technological class level, we aggregate those values and for each class, get a claims-weighted 
patent count. If there are no pledged patents in the technological class, it obtains an openness score 
of zero. We believe that using this measure, instead of simply adding up the number of patents that 
were pledged in each technological class, better represents the class’ scope of openness, as patent 
claims reflect the coverage of specific elements in the inventions (Cohen & Lemley, 2001) and the 
latter’s value (Allison et al. 2004, Bessen 2008). 
In Table 1, we describe the rest of the variables used in our analyses. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
2.4.2 Analytical Approach 
In our models, we regress the response variables of interest at the technological class level on 
the class’ degree of openness and estimate the following linear model: 
Yjt = α + β Opennessj + δ Opennessj * After 2005j + uj + εjt, 
where (Yjt) represents the dependent variables in the technological class j, and year t. Opennessj 
measures the extent of the presence of the technological class j in the patent pledge, as explained 
above. The effect of outbound openness, the main effect of interest, is captured by the interaction 
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term between the openness measure and the dummy variable After 2005, taking a value of 1 for 
the years 2005-2010, and 0 for years 1999-2004. Our empirical models, thus, represent a 
difference-in-differences design, which includes a continuous treatment. For the error components, 
uj captures an class-specific effect and εjt is an idiosyncratic error term. Finally, our models include 
year fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the level of technological class level, the source 
of variation. 
2.5 RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables in our analyses. There are 2116 
class-year observations for our sample period between 1999 and 2010. In total, there are 177 
technological classes, out of which 50 were opened up due to IBM’s pledge in 2005. The average 
technological class has around 19000 patents, and about 80 of those, on average, are radical. This 
is consistent with the intuition from prior work that radical innovations occur less frequently than 
incremental innovations. The participants in the class annually trade, on average, almost 600 
patents. The correlation matrix among the main variables is presented in Table 3. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Before presenting the main results from our regression analyses, we provide some descriptive 
evidence in Figure 3, which presents the dynamics of our main dependent variables in knowledge 
domains (technological classes) characterized by high and low openness35. The figure 
demonstrates that after the patent pledge of 2005, there is a substantial growth (slight decline) in 
the total number of a) patents, b) different assignees, c) radical patents, in technological classes 
                                                 
35 We consider a technological class as having a high (low) openness if it is among technological classes with the 




with a high (low) level of openness. In contrast, there is little decrease in the number of new-to-
the-field entrants in the technological classes characterized by high openness, while the decline is 
considerable in classes with low openness. As for the trading activities, classes with both high and 
low levels of openness experienced an increase in the number of traded patents, but the increase 
in classes with a high openness score seems to have been substantially larger. Though these graphs 
provide preliminary evidence for our hypotheses, we need to perform further analysis to confirm 
the results. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
2.5.1 Main Results 
Table 4 reports how the number of participants (H2a) and new-to-the-field participants (H2b) 
are linked to strategic openness. The positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term in 
column (1) suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in the openness of the technological 
class is associated with around 29 more assignees in that class after the pledge (approximately a 
0.11-standard-deviation increase in assignees). Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 show that the 
number of new-to-the-field entrants is not affected by outbound openness after the pledge, while 
the effect on the percentage of new-to-the-field entrants out of Total assignees class is negative and 
significant. Overall, these findings provide support for H2a and H2b. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 reports the results for the amount of the innovative output (H1), radical innovations 
created (H3) and trading activities (H4). The interaction term in column (1) is positive and 




class is associated with 181 more patents in that class after 2005. Though the effect is modest, if 
one takes into account the average number of applications filed each year in each class (around 
190,000), it is statistically significant. Further, the results in column (2) provide support for H3. In 
particular, as expected, the effects of the interaction term on the number of radical patents in the 
technological class are positive and significant at 1%. More specifically, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the openness score of the technological class is associated with 15 more radical patents 
in that class after the pledge. Column (3) shows that the number of patents traded in the class are 
increasing with more openness introduced to the technological class. Analogously, an increase in 
the openness score of a technological class by one standard deviation is associated with 101 traded 
patents in that class after 2005. Overall, the findings in Table 5 are consistent with the intuition 
from H1, H3, and H4. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
2.5.2 Robustness Checks and Additional Analysis  
Innovation volume, type and trading activities. The results in Table 5 are based on 
technological classes that include the patents from all the firms in those classes. To rule out the 
possibility that these results are driven by the fact that IBM’s patents are included in the 
technological classes (especially taking into account IBM’s leading position in terms of the number 
of patents received36), we perform the same analyses, but excluding IBM patents from the 
technological classes. Moreover, we test the results for patent trading, excluding the trading 
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activities where IBM is involved in, either as a seller or as a buyer. Similarly, this test aims to rule 
out the possibility that the trading boost after the pledge can be mainly driven by IBM transactions. 
We define the dependent variables regarding the total number of patents (Non-IBM patents 
Class), the number of radical patents (Non-IBM radical patents Class) and the number of traded 
patents (Total non-IBM trading Class) in a similar manner as the original variables (see Table 1). 
The results in Table 6 indicate that the effect of openness on the number of patents that do not 
belong to IBM is positive and significant at 1% significance level. In more details, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the openness of the technological class is associated with 113 more patents 
being filed in that class after 2005. Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
significant for the number of radical patents that do not belong to IBM, meaning that increasing 
openness by one standard deviation is linked to 12 more patents that are radical and that are not 
filed by IBM. The results in column (3) support the proposition that the trading activities witnessed 
an increased after IBM decision to liberate 500 patents, with and without considering IBM’s 
trading activities. Overall, these findings confirm that the results in Table 5 do not simply represent 
IBM’s presence in the knowledge domains, and that others in the industry are also affected by 
strategic openness.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Patent-level analyses. The results in Tables 5 (columns (2) and (3)) and Table 6 (columns (2) 
and (3)), show that the opened-up technological classes experienced a rise in the number of radical 
patents (H3) and trading activities (H4). Accordingly, one would expect that at the patent level, 
the pledge will generate spillovers in terms of radical knowledge and that these products of the 




support for our H3 and H4, in a different set of analyses, we build our sample at the level of patent 
(with patent-year observations), following the method from Matr & Ayvazyan (2019). We 
construct the control group of patents (initial control group) for the 500 pledged patents (initial 
treated group) by matching each pledged patent with patents having similar abstracts following 
Arts, Cassiman, & Gomez (2017) approach of text matching. We also restrict the control group to 
patents from the same technological class and the same application year as the treated patent. Our 
control group consists of 1351 patents, including three control patents, on average, for each 
pledged patent. As citations are considered a common and valid way to capture relatedness and 
knowledge flows between patents (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 2000), we differentiate in the 
next step between direct and indirect citations received by the initial treated and control groups of 
patents. Specifically, a “level-one” patent is a patent that draws upon any of the treated or control 
initial patents, thus representing a direct citation. An indirect citation is captured by “level-two” 
patents that cite any of the level-one patents37. Overall, the intuition behind these analyses is that 
the knowledge flows, proxied by the direct and indirect citations, will be more radical in nature 
and will be more likely to be traded, if they are related to the pledged, rather than control group of 
patents. 
Empirically, we replicate a similar model to the one estimated for the class-level analyses, 
where we construct our main independent variable capturing patent’s openness, by identifying 
whether the patent is related to any of the pledged patents. We construct the dummy variable 
Pledged-related patent, taking the value of 1 if the patent represents a direct or an indirect citation 
to any pledged patent. Thus, the difference-in-differences design at this level includes a 
dichotomous treatment variable, where the dependent variables are the probability of level-one 
                                                 




and level-two patents being radical, and the probability of them being traded. The linear model we 
estimate is as follows: 
Yjt = α + β Pledge-related patentj + δ Pledge-related patentj * After 2005j + uj + εjt, 
Table 7 reports how outbound openness affects the radicalness of the subsequent inventions at 
the patent level. Pledge-related patent in column (1) is restricted to level-one patents, and includes 
level-two patents in column (2). The coefficient of the interaction term for level-one patents’ 
radicalness is insignificant, while the one for the radicalness of level-two patents is positive and 
significant (p<0.01). Numerically, an indirect citation to a pledged patent after 2005 is more likely 
to be radical in nature by 9%. Overall, these findings shed light into what kind of knowledge is 
subsequently created due to strategic openness. In particular, while we do not find evidence that 
the patents that directly cite the pledged patents are more radical if they cite after the pledge, we 
do find support that the patents with indirect citations (level-two patents) are more radical due to 
the pledge.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
As an additional test for Hypothesis 4, in Table 8, we conduct a patent-level analysis to further 
explore the effect of outbound openness on knowledge markets. Specifically, we check for the 
likelihood of a patent being traded, depending on whether or not the patent is related to the pledge. 
We construct the sample pooling both the level-one and the level-two patents and, to determine 
traded patents at a given point in time, we match them with patents in the USPTO Patent 
Assignment Dataset. Thus, the dependent variable is a dummy, with a value of 1, if the patent is 
traded, and 0 otherwise. The variable Pledge-related patent in this table is made equal to zero for 




As control variables, we include patent’s forward citations (standardized by the application year 
and technological class), – which can be a proxy for the patent’s quality, an important factor when 
it comes to trading a patent, – and the openness level of the patent’s technological class. The results 
in column (1) show that being related to the pledged patents is associated with an increase of 6.8% 
in the probability of being traded. Analogously to the analysis in column (3) in Table 6, column 
(2) considers only those patents, where IBM is not a main party in the transaction. The results hold 
and economically, seem to be similar to those in the first column of Table 8, thereby confirming 
the intuition that the trading of the subsequently created patents was affected by the knowledge 
liberation. Untabulated results suggest that the effect on trading is mainly driven by the level-two 
patents, similar to the previous analyses on the radicalness of the subsequently created inventions. 
Mainly, these outcomes provide an additional and specific support for the argument that outbound 
openness enhances the volume of trading activities in the technology markets. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
IBM’s patent pledge and the launch of OIN. To rule out the possibility that the findings 
presented and discussed so far are confounded by the launch of the Open Invention Network (OIN) 
in 2005, we integrate the latter in our class-level analyses and present the results in Tables 9 and 
10. OIN is an organization, established by big companies, such as IBM, Novell, Philips, Red Hat, 
and Sony, to provide the developers in the OSS community with protection and support for 
advancing OSS. One of the main functions of the OIN is buying patents that can potentially impose 
a litigation threat for the OSS inventors, and then providing these patents royalty-free for the 




their OSS patents for the other members, and in return, are offered the option to use the other 
members’ patents via cross-licensing.  
Empirically, we create a variable capturing the magnitude of the knowledge liberated by OIN 
in each technological class, following a similar approach used to build our Openness variable 
(claims-weighted patent count). Columns (1), (3), and (5) in Tables 9 and 10, report the effect of 
OIN solely without the consideration of IBM’s patent pledge. Meanwhile, Columns (2), (4), and 
(6) show the results, where both OIN launch and IBM’s patent pledge are considered 
simultaneously. The results in Table 9 provide evidence that the positive effect of the patent pledge 
on the total number of participants found in our main analysis was not associated with establishing 
OIN, as the coefficient between Openness and After 2005 does not seem to be affected by adding 
OIN into the analysis in model 2. We cannot make the same statement regarding the effect on 
New-to-the-field entrants, as it does not seem to be consistent for when we account for OIN’s 
launch or consider the pledge only. However, the effect of the pledge on the new-to-the-field 
entries as a percentage out of the total number of participants remains negative, as shown in model 
6, confirming the results from the main analysis. OIN seems to have had a negative effect on the 
rate of the new entrants. A possible explanation for this is that OIN was established to protect the 
active developers in the OSS community and not to encourage the inventors with no previous 
experience. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
In Table 10, we replicate the results from Table 5 on the analyses of total patent applications, 
radical inventions, and patent trading, by adding the effect of OIN launch in the analyses. The 




radicalness, seem to be uncontaminated by the contemporaneous event of lunching OIN, as shown 
in models 2 and 4. Though the effect of IBM patent pledge on the amount of trading activities at 
the class-level is not straightforward to disentangle from the effect of OIN (as both events seem to 
be intensifying the firms’ tendency toward engaging in transactions in the markets for technology), 
the inclusion of the OIN in the analysis does not seem to change the direction of the effect of the 
pledge.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Outbound openness over time. In this subsection, we aim at getting more insights on the effect 
of openness on the main variables of interest, in terms of whether and how it changes over time 
after the shock. Similar to Matr & Ayvazyan (2019), we divide the period after the patent pledge 
in our sample period, 2006-2010, into smaller periods. More specifically, we gather the first two 
years after 2005 in one block, and the years 2008 and 2009, into a second block. Finally, the year 
2010 represents the last block. We interact these periods with the openness measure to investigate 
the concentration of the effect over time. Table 11 demonstrates the results for this analysis and 
shows that the effect is fairly distributed over the three smaller periods, with being slightly 
intensified in the second period, years 2008 and 2009. Figure 4 provides a graphical representation 
of the effect of outbound openness over time on our response variables of interest. The separate 
figures provide support for our main findings on the effect of openness and are consistent with our 
analyses in Table 11. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 





2.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper sheds light on the relationship between strategic openness and the subsequent 
innovation process in the field of knowledge. Consistent with our hypotheses, the findings show 
that a substantial amount of liberated knowledge boosts up the innovation process at the knowledge 
domain level via increased innovative output, more novel knowledge created and more trading 
activities in markets for technology. Interestingly, our results regarding the effect of openness on 
the market structure characteristics contrast the ones from Murray et al. (2016). Specifically, we 
find that outbound openness encourages more participants to invent in the affected areas; however, 
this effect does not carry over into new-to-the-field entrants. The latter result contradicts the 
finding of Murray et al. (2016) and it seems to go against the open innovation premise of increasing 
access to new markets and reducing potential barriers to market entry. One possible explanation 
for these conflicting results is that the type of the opened-up knowledge might moderate the effect 
of outbound openness on the new-to the field entries rates. More specifically, according to Sosa 
(2009), R&D competencies can be application-specific (i.e. market-specific) and technology-
specific (i.e. non-market-specific), dependent on whether these competencies can be used in one 
or multiple markets. One can expect that if the opened-up knowledge is related to application-
specific competencies, it will increase market entries, because the liberated knowledge makes a 
significant difference in reducing access costs for new-to-the-field entrants, as noted by Murray et 
al. (2016). On the other hand, opened-up knowledge that is related to technology-specific R&D 
competencies would require new-to-the-field entrants to allocate substantial amount of efforts to 
transform it into knowledge that is applicable to a specific market. Consequently, one could expect 




affect market entries, because the liberated knowledge would still exhibit uncertainty in making 
use of the knowledge. 
This research provides insights for the policy makers on promoting the liberation of 
knowledge. Outbound openness has the potential to stimulate the innovation output at the 
knowledge domain-level and also it can improve the radicalness of the inventions created, which 
can help the products performances and the economic growth generally. However, outbound 
openness encourages the firms with existing know-how to get more involved in knowledge 
creation while it seems to discourage the new-to-the-field developers from entering new fields 
regardless of the knowledge availability. These consequences on the competition dynamics in the 
market should be considered in these situations. Furthermore, the knowledge liberation makes the 
markets for technology substantially more active, which improves the fit of the innovation and the 
firms, as well as incentivizes the specialization among firms in the supply and the demand sides. 
For future research, more dimensions can be considered to construct a wider picture of the effect 
of knowledge liberation. Factors, such as market shares and competition, entry of new markets, or 
other firms’ tendency towards adopting outbound openness, are among the interesting 






Table 12: Variable descriptions 
Variable name Variable description (all variables are yearly measures) Level of 
analysis 
Dependent variables Data source: Patentsview.org (patents, citations), USPTO 
(reassignments) 
 
Total patents Class Number of patents in a given technological class. Class 
Total assignees Class Number of assignees/participants (U.S. and foreign firms, universities, 




Count of new-to-the-field assignees. An assignee is considered as new to the 





Proportion of New-to-the-field entrants out of Total assignees. Class 
Radical patents Class Value summation of the radical patents in a given technological class. Class 
Total trading Class Number of patents traded in a given technological class. Class 
Radical Level-one (Level-
two) patent 
1 if the level-one (level-two) patent is radical, 0 otherwise. Patent 
Traded patent 1 if the patent is traded, 0 otherwise. Patent 
Independent variables Data source: Patentsview.org (patents, citations)  
Openness Summation of the claims of the patents that were pledged by IBM in a given 
technological class in 2005. 
Class 
After 2005 1 if the application year of the patent is after 2005, 0 otherwise. Class & 
Patent 
Pledged-related patent 1 if the patent directly or indirectly cites any of the 500 pledged patents of 
2005 (i.e. is level-one or level-two), 0 otherwise. 
Patent 
Pledge related Level-one 
patent 
1 if the level-one patent cites any of the pledged patents. Patent 
Pledge related Level-two 
patent 
1 if the level-two patent cites any of the pledge related level-one (two) 
patents. 
Patent 
Patent age The difference between the application year and the given year. Patent 
Patent standardized 
forward citations 
Forward citations of the patent, standardized by technological class and 
year. 
Patent 







Table 13: Descriptive statistics  
VARIABLES Mean S.D. Min Max 
Openness 80.171 266.586 0 2184 
Total patents Class 18954.589 18760.652 35 96356 
Total assignees Class 287.446 274.288 1 1639 
New-to-the-field entrants Class 114.546 111.037 0 713 
New-to-the-field entrants Class (%) 0.405 0.116 0 1 
Radical patents Class 80.076 95.195 0 570 
Total trading Class 597.076 762.882 0 7500 
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics on the main variables used in the current study. The variables are 
described in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 14: Correlation matrix 
 VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Openness 1       
2 Total patents Class 0.158 1      
3 Total assignees Class 0.119 0.844 1     
4 New-to-the-field entrants Class 0.150 0.762 0.962 1    
5 New-to-the-field entrants Class (%) 0.051 -0.187 -0.061 0.087 1   
6 Radical patents Class 0.239 0.949 0.810 0.741 -0.160 1  
7 Total trading Class 0.136 0.792 0.722 0.607 -0.235 0.777 1 
Note: This table provides the correlation matrix among the main variables used in this study. The variables are 






Table 15: Outbound openness and market structure characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total assignees Class New-to-the-field 
entrants Class 
New-to-the-field 













Constant 248.9*** 111.5*** 0.443*** 
  (19.48) (8.576) (0.008) 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 2,076 2,076 2,076 
No of tech classes 177 177 177 
Note: This table reports the results from linear regressions of the effect of outbound openness after 2005 on the total 
number of participants, new-to-the-field entrants, and the percentage of new-to-the-field entrants out of the total 
number of participants in the technological classes. The variables are described in Table 1. Robust standard errors are 







Table 16: Outbound openness and inventive volume, type, and markets for technology 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  Total patents Class Radical patents Class Total Trading Class 
Openness 0.550* 0.057* 0.193 
  (0.314) (0.031) (0.147) 
Openness x After 2005 0.678*** 0.056*** 0.381*** 
  (0.180) (0.017) (0.139) 
Constant 729.6*** 64.1*** 335.6*** 
  (68.970) (6.227) (32.560) 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 2,066 2,066 2,076 
No of tech classes 177 177 177 
Note: This table reports the results from linear regressions of the effect of outbound openness after 2005 on the total 
number of patents, radical patents, and traded patents in the technological classes. The variables are described in Table 




Table 17: Outbound openness and inventive volume, type, and markets for technology, 
technological classes without IBM patents 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Non-IBM patents Non-IBM radical patents Total non-IBM Trading Class 
Openness 0.323 0.0389 0.163 
 (0.229) (0.0249) (0.134) 
Openness x After 2005 0.425*** 0.048*** 0.340*** 
 (0.122) (0.014) (0.127) 
Constant 608.3*** 57.68*** 317.9*** 
 (54.150) (5.509) (30.240) 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 2,116 2,116 2,076 
Number of tech classes 177 177 177 
Note: This table reports the results from linear regressions of the effect of outbound openness after 2005 on the 
technological classes’ total number of patents and radical patents that do not belong to IBM, and traded patents, 
where IBM is not a buyer or a seller. The variables are described in Table 1. Robust standard errors are in 







Table 18: Relatedness to the pledged patents and the radicalness of the subsequent inventions 
 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES Radical Level-one patent Radical Level-two patent 
Pledge-related patent -0.029** -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.021) 
Pledge-related patent x After 2005 -0.010 0.090*** 
 (0.015) (0.023) 
Patent Age 0.015*** 0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.103*** 0.333*** 
 (0.012) (0.020) 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 11,287 159,469 
Number of patents 1,784 31,492 
Note: This table reports the results from linear regressions of the effect of outbound openness after 2005 on the 
radicalness of the subsequently created level-one and level-two patents. Pledge-related patent includes level-
one patents in column (1) and level-two patents in column (2). The variables are described in Table 1. Robust 




Table 19: Relatedness to the pledged patents and the probability of being traded 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Traded patent Traded patent by non-IBM 
Pledge-related patent 0.068*** 0.067*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Openness -5.96e-05*** -6.02e-05*** 
 (1.20e-06) (1.20e-06) 
Patent standardized forward citations 0.029*** 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.265*** 0.265*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 979,729 979,729 
Number of patents 170,924 170,924 
Note: This table reports the results from linear regressions of the effect of outbound openness after 2005 on the 
probability of the patent being traded. Pledge-related patent is made equal to zero for all the years before 2005. The 
variables are described in Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 






Table 20: Outbound openness and market structure characteristics, the confounding effect of OIN 



















Openness  2.446***  1.480***  0.002*** 
  (0.039)  (0.018)  (0.000) 
OIN Openness  0.308*** -0.672*** 0.165*** -0.431*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (0.045) (0.022) (0.022) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Openness x After 2005 8.456 4.616 -28.649*** -30.703*** -0.106*** -0.105*** 
 (8.901) (8.704) (4.055) (4.076) (0.009) (0.009) 
OIN openness x After 2005 0.087 -0.001 -0.003 -0.051*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.053) (0.041) (0.026) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 173.899*** 175.720*** 95.823*** 96.797*** 0.505*** 0.504*** 
 (5.764) (5.684) (2.349) (2.301) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 
Number of tech classes 177 177 177 177 177 177 
Note: This table reports the results from linear regressions of the effect of outbound openness after 2005 on the total 
number of participants, new-to-the-field entrants, and the percentage of new-to-the-field entrants out of the total 
number of participants in the technological classes, controlling for the effect of the launch of OIN. OIN openness is 
the claims-weighted patent count at the class level of OIN American patents in each technological class. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 21: Outbound openness and inventive volume, type, and markets for technology, the 
confounding effect of OIN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Openness  4.715***  0.452***  -0.269 
  (0.228)  (0.019)  (0.175) 
OIN Openness  1.127*** -0.614*** 0.104*** -0.065*** -0.196 -0.078 
 (0.261) (0.115) (0.022) (0.010) (0.130) (0.084) 
Openness x After 2005 78.617* 56.447 1.383 -0.547 544.931*** 544.370*** 
 (44.079) (42.179) (3.512) (3.366) (73.889) (73.820) 
OIN openness x After 2005 0.584* 0.078 0.045* 0.001 0.702*** 0.689*** 
 (0.308) (0.231) (0.026) (0.020) (0.152) (0.168) 
Constant 427.509*** 437.973*** 38.518*** 39.433*** 137.212*** 137.478*** 
 (27.327) (26.481) (2.308) (2.234) (25.045) (25.032) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 
Number of tech classes 177 177 177 177 177 177 
Note: This table reports the results from linear regressions of the effect of outbound openness after 2005 on the total 
number of patents, radical patents, and traded patents in the technological classes, controlling for the effect of the 
launch of OIN. OIN openness is the claims-weighted patent count at the class level of OIN American patents in each 
technological class. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 





Table 22: Outbound openness and its effect over time 















Openness 0.844*** 0.369*** 0.000 3.449*** 0.306*** 0.644*** 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.000) (0.142) (0.013) (0.122) 
Openness x Years 2006&2007  0.103*** 0.041** -0.000* 0.618*** 0.054*** 0.241** 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.000) (0.151) (0.014) (0.104) 
Openness x Years 2008&2009 0.116*** 0.034 -0.000*** 0.744*** 0.059*** 0.511*** 
 (0.039) (0.026) (0.000) (0.219) (0.020) (0.163) 
Openness x Year 2010 0.121*** 0.017 -0.000*** 0.645** 0.049** 0.708** 
 (0.043) (0.025) (0.000) (0.251) (0.024) (0.293) 
Constant 175.085*** 96.930*** 0.505*** 433.090*** 39.041*** 132.671*** 
 (5.654) (2.275) (0.007) (26.382) (2.218) (25.910) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 
Number of tech classes 177 177 177 177 177 177 
Note: This table reports the results from linear regressions of the effect of outbound openness after 2005 in smaller 
time periods on all the variables of interest at the level of the technological class. Robust standard errors are in 





Figure 1: Outbound openness and the subsequent innovation process 
 
Note: This figure38 depicts the implications of outbound openness on the innovation amount and type, market structure 
characteristics, and trading activities in markets for technology, as discussed in the section Theory and Hypotheses. 
 
  
                                                 
38 This figure is adapted from Figure 1 in Ayvazyan, Matr (2019, p. 47) that illustrates the implications of outbound 




Figure 2: Total patent applications by IBM and total patent applications by all the firms in 
treated vs control technological classes 
 
Note: This figure depicts the evolution of the number of patent applications made by IBM and the number of patent 
applications made by all the firms in the treated and control technological classes. The series with the dark line 
represents the control group, while the one with the light gray line represents the treated group of classes.  
  




Figure 3: Average number of total patents, assignees, new-to-the-field entrants and trading in 
markets for technology in high and low technological classes before and after the pledge 
 
Note: This figure depicts the average Total patents Class, Total assignees Class, New-to-the-field entrants Class, Radical 
patents Class, Total trading Class, for technological classes with high versus low levels of openness before and after 
2005. High openness (Low openness) refers to the first (last) ten technological classes, according to their openness 
measure. Before 2005 includes the period between 1999 and 2004, while After 2005 includes the period from 2005 to 
2010. 
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Figure 4: Outbound openness and inventive volume, market structure characteristics, inventive type, and markets for technology 
 
Note: This figure depicts the effect of outbound openness on Total patents Class, Total assignees Class, New-to-the-field entrants Class, Radical patents Class, Total 
trading Class over time. 
 
Total patents Class Total assignees Class New-to-the-field entrants Class 






Chapter 3  
Board Independence and Acquisitions of 






While the benefits of incorporating outside knowledge into firm’s innovative trajectories39 
have been well acknowledged among both academics (Teece, 2006; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006, Laursen & Salter, 2006; Arora & Gambardella, 2010) and 
practitioners (Huston & Sakkab, 2006), examples of organizations’ resisting externally 
developed40 ideas and inputs are plenty. In the early 1990’s, Apple Inc.’s managers, being 
skeptical about the ideas stemming from external sources (Burrows & Greene, 2000), 
stubbornly rejected implementing a two-button, instead of a one-button computer mouse 
design, long after the feedback from the market and the conducted usability research revealed 
that mouse devices should optimally have two buttons (Lidwell, Holden, & Butler, 2010). 
Another practice is Philip’s redesigning and reengineering the already famous Sonicare power-
toothbrush (Lidwell et al., 2010), after its acquisition of Optiva Corporation, the producer of 
that toothbrush, in 2000.   
This bias against external knowledge and innovations, labeled as the “Not Invented Here” 
(NIH) syndrome is present in many organizations (Antons & Piller, 2015) and may ultimately 
result in suboptimal performance and superfluous effort in creating duplicative innovations 
(Katz & Allen, 1982; Allen et al., 1988). Though it is particularly well documented in the prior 
literature at the level of R&D workers and teams (Katz & Allen, 1982; Kathoefer & Leker, 
2012; de Araújo Burcharth, Knundsen, & Søndergaard, 2014), it can also span across all the 
other organizational levels, including the R&D managers and CEOs. Accordingly, the NIH 
syndrome may induce organizations to reject potentially valuable pieces of external knowledge 
                                                 
39 Benefits from the external knowledge acquisition have been discussed in the prior literature. Among other 
benefits, they can facilitate a) avoidance of having duplicative innovations, b) a faster and arguably less uncertain 
way to obtain the innovative outcomes in comparison to internal R&D solutions, c) a better fit for innovations and 
the firms and d) a specialization of innovative labor (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). 
40 The externality can have different levels: spatial, organizational, and hierarchical (Antons & Piller, 2015). In 




(Agrawal, Cockburn & Rosell, 2010; Hussinger & Wastyn, 2016), leading to a slower and less 
efficient development of technological solutions. Thus, given the complexity of the process of 
the absorption of external knowledge - which should not be taken for granted (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990) - a question of interest arises: What mechanisms can help firms counteract 
such NIH behaviors? 
In this paper, we test whether the independent directors on the board can help increase 
outside knowledge acquisitions and mitigate the problem of NIH in technology-intensive 
industries. This syndrome can be interpreted as an agency issue (Antons & Piller, 2015), where 
individuals (e.g. CEOs and R&D managers) may bear important personal costs in taking 
actions to change attitudes and thus end up acting opportunistically (Eisenhardt, 1989). Prior 
research has shown that greater board independence, which brings in increased monitoring on 
managers and advising, helps to solve the agency problem, primarily through its supervisory 
function. Besides, the structural independence of these directors suggests that their greater 
presence on the board leads to a better control of managerial decisions made on behalf of the 
firm’s shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Since outside directors are not subordinate to (and 
therefore, their careers do not depend on) the CEOs, they are more likely to confront managerial 
decisions that can potentially put the interests of the shareholders at risk. Rather, these directors 
have the credibility to fire the CEOs after a poor performance (e.g. Williamson, 1983). 
Recent research has shown that due to their monitoring role, independent directors 
influence the amount and type of the innovations internally developed by companies 
(Balsmeier, Fleming, & Manso, 2017). The authors primarily draw on career concerns 
perspective when interpreting the findings of increased innovative output delivered by firms 
and enhanced performance along known innovative trajectories. They explain that managers 
become more risk-averse and more inclined to put managerial effort to yield innovative 




directors can operate as a mechanism to overcome the NIH syndrome and spur the acquisition 
of external knowledge. An important element in our theoretical arguments is that the 
strengthened monitoring and advice from these directors will push managers to recognize 
opportunities and exploit outside knowledge through markets for technology. Thus, we 
hypothesize and empirically demonstrate that a higher presence of independent directors is 
associated with a higher probability of acquiring outside knowledge. A complementary 
difference-in-difference analysis using the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) in the U.S. in 
2002 as an exogenous shock in the presence of independent members in boards of directors 
(Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2011; Balsmeier et al., 2017) suggests that the relationship is 
likely to be causal. Furthermore, we provide evidence indicating that the positive impact of 
independent directors on the acquisition of external knowledge is stronger for companies with 
more stable R&D teams, where the NIH syndrome is more likely to be present. Finally, our 
results also indicate that the impact of independent directors is less intense in corporate contexts 
where the CEO has more power, suggesting that the process is driven by the monitoring role 
of independent directors rather than their advisory role. Overall, the evidence provided by this 
collection of findings suggests that the presence of independent directors in corporate boards 
favors the incorporation of external knowledge by inducing managers to take actions to 
overcome the NIH syndrome.  
Our study makes a contribution to the field of organizational strategy by connecting the 
consequences of actions at the corporate governance level to organizational outcomes that are 
to a large extent driven by individual and group processes. Past research on potential remedies 
to the NIH syndrome has pointed at the structure of intra-organizational communication 
patterns and the incentive system (Merwald, 1999; Pay, 1995; as cited in Antons & Piller, 
2015). Our results suggest that any action in these (or other) aspects of organizational structure 




managers and, thus, needs to be encouraged at the highest corporate level. Our results also 
contribute to the corporate governance literature on the role of independent members of boards 
of directors. Independent directors are typically seen as providers of counsel and oversight to 
top managers. Our evidence indicates that their impact on external acquisitions of knowledge 
diminishes with the position of the power of the CEO. While this result does not necessarily 
neglect the advisory role of independent directors, it underlines the relevance of their 
monitoring function. Finally, we also contribute to the line of literature on the factors that lead 
to under-investing in external technology acquisitions (see Arora & Gambardella, 2010). This 
research, compared to other factors like firm’s capacity to identify and assimilate external 
knowledge flows (see, e.g., Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010; Zou, Ertug, & George, 2018), has 
paid relatively less attention to the role of the attitudes of the members of the organization 
towards external pieces of knowledge. 
3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
To derive theoretical predictions on the effect of board independence on firm’s 
engagement in acquisitions of external knowledge, we draw from different strands of literature. 
We begin this section by analyzing prior research to argue that independent directors can affect 
the firm’s decision to acquire external knowledge. Next, we hypothesize how this impact might 
be moderated in contexts where NIH is especially relevant. Finally, we investigate the 
moderating effect in contexts where the board’s monitoring function is mitigated.  
3.2.1 Independent Directors and the Acquisition of External knowledge 
Extant literature has analyzed the role of independent members of corporate boards of 
directors (see Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010, for a review). While internal members of 




loyalty to the CEO (Pfeffer, 1981), outside directors’ incentives are expected to be better 
aligned with shareholders’ interests (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Byrd & Hickman, 1992, 
Duchin, Matsusaka & Ozbas, 2010). Because their actions are driven by their reputation as 
directors (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014), their presence in corporate boards contributes to a more 
intense monitoring and advising of company managers (Faleye et al., 2011).  
The oversight and advice of independent directors, however, does not necessarily lead to 
better strategic decisions. To the extent that independent directors may have less firm-specific 
information than insiders, they may decrease the value of decision-making. Accordingly, 
research has found that while independent members contribute to intensifying the supervisory 
function of boards, the impact of this increased monitoring on shareholder value will depend 
on the complexity of corporate activities (Duchin et al., 2010; Faleye et al., 2011). In terms of 
innovation policy, Balsmeier et al. (2017) identify a shift towards more patent-intensive and 
familiar technologies in firms whose board of directors transitioned from a non-independent to 
an independent majority. This evidence suggests that an increase in the presence of independent 
directors in corporate boards induces managers to focus on more tangible indicators of R&D 
performance. 
In terms of the balance between the use of internal and external sources of knowledge, past 
research has documented a clear tendency by individuals to oppose against ideas and 
technologies that are considered to come from the outside, with negative consequences for the 
long-term innovation performance of their organizations. This NIH syndrome (Clagett, 1967) 
takes place at the group level (Katz & Allen, 1982), but also at the organizational level 
(Agrawal et al., 2010, Hussinger & Wastyn, 2016). The NIH syndrome in innovation activities 
may be the result of rational R&D workers trying to avoid adding a new burden to their 
workload or implicitly disclosing negative information on the value of their past output (Antons 




alternatives, such as the confirmation bias that leads people to cherry-pick information 
consistent with their initial prior assessments (Nickerson 1998), or in-group favoritism spurred 
by the defense of an organizational identity leading to suboptimal technical decisions 
(Hussinger & Wastyn, 2016).  
Independently of its individual or social roots, the NIH syndrome has traditionally been 
seen by the academic literature and managerial practice as an important obstacle to the creation 
of value, closely associated with organizational inertia (Antons & Piller, 2015). Individuals and 
groups in the R&D function of firms are expected to show resistance to change, especially 
when it involves incorporating outside knowledge. Managers may also suffer from the NIH 
syndrome at the organizational level. Even if they do not, they will find it particularly costly to 
implement projects that involve integrating outside pieces of knowledge and will therefore tend 
to discard them. Thus, the NIH syndrome can be viewed as an agency problem at the corporate 
level, and a higher presence of independent directors in the corporate board will contribute to 
overcoming this tendency. First of all, the supervisory function of independent directors is 
expected to attenuate the agency problem in the firm’s governance in general. Independent 
directors tend to promote more incentive-based pay (Knyazeva, Knyazeva & Masulis, 2013). 
This may induce managers to bear the personal costs of making an unpopular R&D decision 
that they would have otherwise avoided. Second, the high level of awareness among 
management practitioners of the existence of NIH syndrome as an obstacle for performance 
makes it particularly likely that actions to overcome it are advised and rewarded by independent 
directors. Even if as company outsiders, they may have more inferior information than inside 
directors for their general strategic advisory role, they are also expected to suffer less from 
biases against external knowledge sources. This is due to their relative isolation from other 
members of the organization, and their increased contact with members from other 




assessment in their evaluation of the technological opportunities faced by the company. In 
conclusion, we expect a higher presence of independent directors in corporate boards to lead 
to an increase in acquisitions of knowledge from other organizations. 
Hypothesis 1: A higher presence of independent members in a firm’s board of directors 
will lead to an increase in acquisitions of external knowledge. 
3.2.2 Research Workforce Stability 
Existing research on the NIH syndrome at the micro level suggests that the process is 
accentuated by project tenure in research groups (Katz & Allen, 1982). Similarly, opposition 
to external knowledge at the organizational level is also related to the stability of its research 
workforce. One of the key drivers of the NIH syndrome at the organizational level is the 
existence of in-group favoritism, and the corresponding out-group derogation, as mechanisms 
that reinforce group affiliation and social identity (Agrawal et al., 2010; Hussinger & Wastyn, 
2016). Actions that strengthen social identity pay group members back in terms of higher self-
esteem and trust, which facilitates intra-group transactions (Efferson, Lalive, & Fehr, 2008). 
Furthermore, the prospect of future repeated interactions among group members induces the 
development of group affiliation and social identity (Lembke & Wilson, 1998). Consequently, 
these processes are favored by a stable group composition. A stable workforce in the 
organization will tend to generate a strong social identity and therefore a strong opposition 
against external contributions. Moreover, a stable research workforce will lead to a particularly 
intense NIH syndrome, since researchers are especially concerned by the incorporation of new 
technological knowledge. As the resistance against external knowledge is linked to the NIH 
syndrome, this will become a setting, where the need for external knowledge is even larger. In 
consequence, corporate governance mechanisms that contribute to alleviating the NIH 




syndrome is particularly likely to be present. 
Hypothesis 2: A higher presence of independent members in a firm’s board of directors 
will lead to a stronger increase in acquisitions of external knowledge in companies with 
a more stable research workforce. 
3.2.3 Stability of Researcher Collaborations 
Past research has also underlined the role of work routines and protocols as antecedents of 
the NIH syndrome (Clagett, 1967; Katz & Allen, 1982; Kathoefer & Leker, 2012). These 
routines and protocols, which generate security among members of the organization, may be 
disturbed by the introduction of external knowledge (Kathoefer & Leker, 2012) and thus 
generate resistance against it. Protocols and routines naturally appear as a coordination 
mechanism among members of the organization that need to co-operate frequently. Even if 
managers centralize to some extent the implementation of procedures in order to regulate the 
interaction between the firm’s members, specific work routines will be more deeply developed 
when members tend to collaborate repeatedly with the same co-workers. In particular, 
researchers that frequently team up with the same group of co-inventors in their innovation 
activities are expected to establish well-developed working routines and oppose to the 
introduction of external knowledge (Katz & Allen, 1982). Hence, the NIH syndrome is 
particularly likely to be present in organizations with stable collaborations among researchers, 
which makes the “objective” need for external knowledge particularly relevant. Therefore, we 
expect that corporate governance mechanisms that counteract this syndrome will be 
particularly useful in this context.  
Hypothesis 3: A higher presence of independent members in a firm’s board of directors 
will lead to a stronger increase in acquisitions of external knowledge in companies with 




3.2.4 Board Monitoring as an Underlying Channel 
CEO duality is frequently viewed as an impediment to the board’s monitoring of top 
executives (Jensen, 1993; Aguilera, 2005) and can serve to entrench a CEO within an 
organization by compromising the board’s abilities to monitor and discipline management 
(Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Tuggle et al., 2010). In addition, Jensen (1993) states that CEOs 
almost always set the agenda and control the information given to the board, which can hinder 
the ability of board members to contribute effectively to the monitoring and evaluation of the 
CEOs. Empirically, Tuggle et al. (2010) show that CEO-Chairs can steer boards’ attention 
away from monitoring issues towards topics that suit their own interests, by setting and 
implementing more detailed, rigid agendas. To the extent that managers suffer from the NIH 
syndrome, a powerful CEO may limit the power of the board to monitor such decisions, by 
managing the information flow and setting the agenda away from topics related to buying 
technology in the market. Taking these arguments together, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 4. A higher presence of independent members in a firm’s board of directors 
will lead to a lower increase in acquisitions of external knowledge in companies with 
CEO duality. 
In addition to having a direct influence on the board monitoring ability, managers may use 
the protection granted by anti-takeover provisions to allocate firm resources for their personal 
benefit (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). This view, sometimes called “managerial welfare 
hypothesis” (Mahoney, Sundaramurthy, & Mahoney, 1997), has received substantial empirical 
support in the literature (see Straska & Waller, 2014). As first stressed by Manne (1965), such 
insulation might harm shareholders by weakening the disciplinary threat of removal and 
thereby increasing shirking, empire-building, and extraction of private benefits by incumbents. 




dismissal and as a result reduce the power of the board to take disciplinary actions, anti-
takeover provisions may also impact the incentives of directors to engage in monitoring. 
Independent directors are usually powerful individuals, present or former CEOs, or top 
professionals with a reputation at stake (Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2011). When the market 
for corporate control becomes active, it serves as evidence of the failure of other governance 
mechanisms (Dalton et al., 2007). To protect their reputation as effective monitors, independent 
directors may have additional incentives to exert influence and steer managers towards firm 
value when there is a credible threat that poor management (and ineffective monitoring) will 
trigger a takeover reaction. As a result, we expect the positive effect of board independence to 
be stronger in the absence of anti-takeover mechanisms.  
Hypothesis 5: A higher presence of independent members in a firm’s board of directors 
will lead to a lower increase in acquisitions of external knowledge in companies with 
anti-takeover provisions. 
3.3 DATA AND METHODS 
3.3.1 Data 
To test our hypotheses, we draw on data from several sources. Information on boards of 
directors is taken from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database that has 
been widely used in the literature on board independence (e.g. Duchin et al., 2010; Balsmeier 
et al., 2017, etc.). Among other items, it classifies each director of an S&P 1500 firm into an 
employee, independent, or linked-affiliated (e.g. former employee, relative of an executive 
director, provider of legal, consulting or financial services to the firm, firm’s customer or 
supplier, etc.) board member. We complement board of directors’ information with firm-level 
financial data, such as sales, R&D expenditures or number of employees from Compustat. For 




historical NBER patent dataset (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001; Bessen, 2009). This dataset 
includes the number of (granted) patents per firm-year and provides a firm identifier allowing 
us to connect the patent-related data with Compustat and IRRC. Finally, we obtain external 
knowledge acquisition data from the USPTO Patent Assignment Dataset (PAD), which 
identifies changes of ownership in the U.S. patents. One advantage of using these data instead 
of licensing or alliance transactions is that most patent ownership transfers are filed with the 
USPTO, since only by recording patent (re)assignments with the database, parties can provide 
evidence of ownership transfer in courts41. For each recorded patent transaction, the dataset 
includes the execution (recording) date, the patent(s)/patent application(s) involved, the names 
of the assignee and the assignor, and the transaction type (e.g. assignment, merger, government, 
name change, etc.). We mainly consider inter-firm assignments of patents and thus disregard 
inventor-to-employer transfer of rights, transactions due to name changes, name corrections, 
government interest or securities.  
Our sample initially comprises a panel of public U.S. firms that were included in the IRRC 
database for the period 1996-2010, with their corresponding records on board structure, patents, 
patent transactions and financial information. After excluding firms from highly regulated 
sectors and financial industries (SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999), as well as firms that do 
not heavily invest in R&D42, we are left with 1716 unique firms and 11711 firm-year 
observations. The final sample size varies across different analyses, according to data 
availability for the different variables. 
                                                 
41 Despite the fact that from a legal perspective, for a patent (re)assignment to be considered as legally binding 
parties have to record it with the USPTO, doing it is not legally mandatory. Therefore, while it cannot be taken 
for granted that data from the PAD accurately represents the population of patent transfers (Marco et al., 2015), 
firms do have incentives to record their patent assignments with the USPTO. As Serrano (2010) notes, “anecdotal 
evidence from interviews with patent lawyers strongly supports the effective recordation of transfer of patents”. 
42 We consider a firm as “heavily investing in R&D,” according to whether or not the R&D spending of the firm 




3.3.2 Empirical Model 
To test how board independence affects firms’ subsequent engagement in acquisitions of 
knowledge from the outside, we estimate the probability that a firm buys at least one patent in 
t+1, using the following linear probability model: 
𝑷𝒊𝒕(𝒀𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 = 𝟏) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒓 %𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸 𝒁𝒊𝒕 +  𝜹𝒊 + 𝜽𝒕 +  𝓔𝒊𝒕, 
where i indexes firm and t indexes year. The dependent variable, Yi,t+1, is a binary indicator 
equal to one, if a firm buys at least one patent in t+1. The main variable of interest, Ind dir %, 
is the share of independent directors on the board of the firm i in year t+1. The vector Zit is 
comprised of time-varying factors used as control variables in the analysis (see Appendix). 
Firm fixed effects are captured by δi to account for unobserved time-invariant firm-level 
heterogeneity, and θt are year fixed effects. We use a linear probability model and cluster 
standard errors at the firm level. 
Addressing Endogeneity. Due to potential endogeneity concerns about board structure 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Adams et al., 2010), a causal claim may not be made from the 
simple OLS estimations, with Buying probability as dependent and Ind dir % as independent 
variables. Board composition reflects a firm choice, which may be correlated with some 
observable, as well as unobservable firm characteristics that also influence the probability of 
engaging in external knowledge acquisitions. Another potential concern is that these variables 
may be jointly determined. On the one hand, enhanced monitoring from the independent 
directors can increase the likelihood of buying outside knowledge. On the other hand, external 
knowledge acquisitions might attract more independent directors to join the firm’s board. 
While the fixed effects in our main empirical model partially address the omitted variable bias, 
it does not necessarily address the possibility of reverse causality. Thus, to obtain a more 




prior studies (e.g. Duchin et al., 2010; Balsmeier et al., 2017; Lu & Wang, 2018) that have 
largely used the regulatory changes requiring public firms to increase their share of independent 
directors on the boards, in order to account for exogenous variations in the share of independent 
directors. 
In particular, we make use of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 following 
the Enron corporate scandal (and the subsequent regulatory changes by NYSE and Nasdaq in 
2003 with stricter requirements) to complement our main analyses with a differences-in-
differences approach43. The main requirement from the regulation was to have a majority of 
independent directors on the board (and a 100% audit committee). Figure 144 provides the 
evolution of board independence over the sampling period 1996-2010 and illustrates a 
substantial increase in the presence of independent directors after 2001. It also shows that from 
around 63% in 1996, the percentage of independent boards increased to about 98% by 2010. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Following existing research, we identify the treated firms as non-compliant, i.e. firms that 
had a minority of independent directors, and the control firms as compliant, i.e. firms that had 
a majority of independent directors and a 100% independent audit committee prior to the 
regulations. Next, we track the point in time when the treated firms switched to a majority 
board independence and had a fully independent audit committee in 2001 or later. Figure 2 
provides a graphical illustration of the average Buying probability among the treated and 
control groups of firms over time. Meanwhile, our regression analyses estimate the following 
model:  
𝑷𝒊𝒕(𝒀𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 = 𝟏) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑻𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒙 𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓_𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒕 + 𝜸 𝒁𝒊𝒕 +  𝜹𝒊 + 𝜽𝒕 +  𝓔𝒊𝒕, 
                                                 
43 For a detailed description of the identification strategy, see e.g. Balsmeier et al. (2017). 




where all the notations remain the same, except from the main term of interest, Treatedi x 
After_treatt, which captures the extra effect of the switch from a minority to a majority board 
independence. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
3.3.3 Dependent Variable 
Acquisition of external knowledge (Buying probability). This variable is a dummy 
indicator that tags whether the firm acquires at least one patent from another firm45 in a given 
year, drawing on data from PAD. A major challenge of using these data for firm-level analyses 
is that the recorded names of the assignees (buyers) and assignors (sellers) have never been 
standardized. Thus, prior to matching PAD with IRRC-Compustat firms, we conduct a name 
standardization procedure (Bessen, 2009; Arora et al., 2019) for the assignee names in both 
databases, in order to decrease the possibilities of spelling inconsistencies (see Appendix 1 that 
provides a detailed description of the steps performed). We also perform some supplementary 
manual checks to account for changes in the names of the firms in our sample, and then fuzzy-
match them with the standardized assignee names from PAD. 
3.3.4 Main Independent Variable 
Percentage of Independent Directors in the Board (Ind dir %). Using information on 
whether the director is independent or not, as provided in the IRRC Director database, our main 
independent variable indicates the ratio between the total number of independent directors on 
the board and the total number of directors on the board. 
                                                 
45 As noted above, we eliminate the transaction from inventors to the focal firm, transactions that are filed due to 
due to name changes, differences, or corrections, due to government interest or securities. Appendix 1 discusses 




3.3.5 Moderators Related to the Intensity of the NIH Syndrome 
Research workforce stability. This variable is constructed following the steps below. First, 
for each firm, we identify its current inventors (patenting in t) using USPTO identifiers 
(Monath & McCallum, 2015). For each of these inventors, we create a dummy indicating 
whether she filed with the firm in t-1 or/and in t-2. We then aggregate these values at the firm-
year level, which allows us to obtain the number of inventors in t that also filed patents with 
the focal firm at t-1 or/and in t-2. Finally, we define Research workforce stability, via dividing 
this number by the total number of inventors patenting in t. The logic behind this measure is 
that a higher proportion of inventors with patents in both one/two years prior and t indicates a 
higher stability of the inventor workforce. 
Inventor interactions stability. For this measure, first, at the inventor-year level, we count 
the number of co-inventors each of the inventors of the firm has in t. Second, for each of the 
focal inventors, we track those co-inventors (from step one) with whom she patented in t-1 
or/and t-2. We then take the ratio between the number of “old” co-inventors (from step 2, with 
previous patenting history) and the total number of current co-inventors. Finally, we aggregate 
these values at the firm-year level, by taking the average. We thus define Inventor interactions 
stability as the average proportion of prior inventor interactions. 
Inventor team stability. To create this variable, first, we start by identifying every exact 
combination of co-inventors in a patent application as a distinct team. For each patent, we 
verify whether the team of inventors patented together in t-1 or/and t-2. We then aggregate 
these values at the firm-year level, creating an indicator of the number of patenting teams that 
have obtained patents with the focal firm in the previous two years. In the final step, we take 





3.3.6 Moderators Related to the Power of the CEO 
The two indicators we use for CEO power are a) CEO duality, which is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the CEO of the firm also acts as the Chairman of the board, and b) EINDEX (i.e. 
Entrenchment Index), which counts the number of the corporate governance provisions in 
place, following the method from Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009). In particular, we compute 
how many of the following measures are in place: golden parachutes, poison pills, classified 
boards, supermajority votes, limited charter amendments, and limited bylaws amendment. All 
these provisions “protect” the managers from getting fired. Therefore, higher (lower) levels of 
EINDEX indicate that the managers are less (more) likely to be subject to career concerns and 
takeover pressures.  
3.3.7 Controls 
We control for Ln(Employees) to allow for a comparison of firms of similar size. We also 
include Ln(R&D/assets), to account for the intensity of the innovation input, R&D; as well as 
Ln(Patents), to account for the innovation output. Other control variables are Ln(Cash/assets), 
Ln(Sale), Ln(Firm age), and Leverage. Appendix 2 describes all the variables used in different 
analyses. 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Descriptive Results 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in this study. The firms in 
our sample are large: they employ on average more than 16800 workers, have around $6.8 
million in net sales and are granted about 44 patents. On average, firms in our sample have a 




average firm is 27 years old, has $593 millions in cash, and invests $192 millions in R&D. The 
correlation matrix from Table 2 does not seem to indicate alarming values for any of the 
correlations among the variables. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
3.4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Panel A in Table 3 demonstrates a positive pair-wise correlation matrix between Ind dir % 
and Buying probability. Panel B can be interpreted in the following way: if greater levels of 
independent directors on the board are linked to a higher probability of IP acquisitions, the 
mean outcome measures should increase across quartiles. Computing the t-statistics of 
differences in means between the quartiles displays a quite consistent positive association 
between the share of independent directors and Buying probability.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 describes the main variable of interest, the share of independent directors on the 
board, according to four quartiles for our sample firms. In the first quartile, the average value 
of the board independence is below 50%, indicating non-independence of the boards, while in 
the next three quartiles, the boards are on average, independent. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 





3.4.3 Main Results 
Columns (1) in Table 5 reports the results from the Linear Probability Model panel 
regressions of Buying probability on Ind dir % (Independent director share) with year and firm 
fixed effects. The findings suggest that there is a positive and significant association between 
board independence and the probability of acquiring external knowledge. A 10 percentage-
point increase in the proportion of independent directors is expected to increase buying 
probability by 0.78 percentage points, which implies around 1.5% increase with respect to the 
average probability level. Column (2) reports the results from a difference-in-differences panel 
analysis, using the SOX regulatory changes, and confirms the results from Column (1), as seen 
from the interaction term Treated x After_treat. These findings support our Hypothesis 1. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6 groups the results from interaction effects for Hypotheses 2 and 3. While we do 
not find enough evidence from Column (1) to support Hypothesis 2, the results from Columns 
(2) and (3) suggest that the effect of board independence on the buying probability is intensified 
when the firm has a more stable pattern of collaborations among inventors. For example, while 
the estimated impact of a 10 percentage-point increase in the share of independent directors on 
Buying probability is of 0.75 percentage points for companies with mean values of team 
stability, the expected effect increases to 1.58 percentage points for companies that double 
these average values. Altogether, we find partial support for the prediction that the effect of 
board independence is especially relevant in contexts where firms are more likely to suffer 
from the NIH syndrome. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 





Table 7 presents the findings from interaction effects that test Hypotheses 4 and 5 and 
suggests that the impact of board independence on buying probability is weakened when CEOs 
are more powerful, that is a) when the CEO is also the Chairman of the board, and b) with 
higher levels of the Entrenchment index. These results are in line with the intuition that when 
CEOs are more powerful, the independent directors’ monitoring role is compromised. In 
particular, the results from the first column provide some support for Hypothesis 4, suggesting 
that the expected marginal effect on Buying probability of a 10 percentage-point increase in 
the share of independent directors decreases from 1.37 percentage points to a (non-significant) 
value of 0.44 percentage point. Likewise, the results shown in the second column offer support 
to Hypothesis 5. The estimated impact of independent directors decreases with the level of 
entrenchment of top managers. The estimated effect on Buying probability of a 10 percentage-
point increase in the share of independent directors, ranges from 2.4 percentage points for 
companies with the lowest entrenchment levels to negative (non-significant) levels for 
companies with the highest levels of entrenchment.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper sheds light on the relationship between board independence and the probability 
of engaging in buying transactions in markets for technology. Many firms are thought to 
underinvest in technology stemming from outside sources, inefficiently prioritizing the one 
created internally (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). This is despite the potential benefits (e.g. a 
faster and more efficient development of innovation, avoidance of duplicative innovations, 




internal R&D processes. The mechanisms that may counteract this so-called NIH syndrome 
have not been paid substantial attention in the prior literature.  
In this paper, adopting an agency perspective, we emphasize the role of the independent 
members of the board in overcoming the NIH-induced tendencies of rejecting external 
knowledge acquisitions. We explain that due to important personal costs, CEOs and R&D 
managers may be reluctant in taking actions for changing attitudes in favor of external 
knowledge incorporations and therefore, may engage in an opportunistic behavior, not in line 
with the interests of shareholders. Further, we argue that due to their supervisory function on 
managerial decisions, independent members of the board are likely to put pressure on CEOs to 
deliver the desired results. The main results from the Linear probability model, as well as the 
analysis, employing the passage of SOX regulations in the early 2000’s, point at a positive 
effect of board independence on the buying probability in markets for technology. The 
aggregate findings from a set of tests for moderating effects, provide partial support for the 
intuition that the impact of independent directors is stronger in contexts in which the NIH 
syndrome is more likely to be present. In particular, the results suggest that the effect is 
intensified for firms with more stable inventor teams. Next, we also find that the effect is 
weakened in contexts where the CEOs are more powerful. Altogether, the propositions from 
our results can be summarized into two points: a) independent directors in corporate boards 
favor the incorporation of outside knowledge and help overcoming the NIH syndrome, and b) 
it is due to the monitoring role of the board of directors that their impact is particularly strong 
in contexts where (according to extant literature on NIH) more intense opposition (and more 
need for external knowledge) is expected. 
Our study contributes to several streams of literature. First, linking corporate-level 
mechanisms with firm-level outcomes that are largely connected to individual- and group-level 




involvement in reducing subjective resistance against outside technologies can be crucial. We 
also contribute to the corporate governance literature, by emphasizing the independent 
directors’ monitoring function. Finally, our results add to the research on markets for 
technology studying the “demand for external technology”, by providing a link between one of 
the factors driving underinvestment in the external technology acquisitions, namely, the 
existence of the NIH syndrome46, with a potential remedy in the form of board independence. 
  
                                                 
46 As Arora & Gambardella (2010) note, the other two possible answers are the absorptive capacity of the firms 





Table 23: Descriptive statistics of selected variables 
VARIABLES  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Buying probability 11711 0.531 0.499 0 1 
 Ind dir % 11711 0.672 0.181 0 1 
 Research workforce stability 5131 0.396 0.220 0 1 
 Inventor interactions stability 4986 0.134 0.154 0 1 
 Inventor team stability  5131 0.262 0.197 0 1 
 CEO duality 10937 0.622 0.485 0 1 
 EINDEX 5553 2.686 1.407 0 6 
 Board size 11711 9.206 2.450 1 21 
 R&D 11711 191.940 713.427 0 12183 
 Patents 11711 44.666 191.828 0 5930.333 
 Employees (in thousands) 11588 26.243 73.919 0.002 2100 
 Sale 11701 6802.781 20444.690 0 425000 
 Firm age 11711 26.859 16.717 1 61 
 Cash 11695 593.400 1520.934 0.609       11155 
 Leverage 11642 0.225 0.179 0 1.678 
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics of the main sample variables used in this analysis. The number of 
observations from control variables vary according to the test described in every table from here on. All variables 




Table 24: Correlation matrix 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Buying probability 1.000               
2 Ind dir % 0.165 1.000              
3 Research workforce stability 0.079 0.072 1.000             
4 Inventor interactions stability 0.009 -0.034 0.602 1.000            
5 Inventor team stability 0.034 0.010 0.779 0.570 1.000           
6 CEO duality 0.051 0.094 -0.044 -0.029 -0.081 1.000          
7 EINDEX 0.036 0.331 0.006 -0.011 -0.008 0.031 1.000         
8 Board size 0.104 0.113 0.061 -0.016 0.013 0.109 0.075 1.000        
9 R&D/assets 0.311 0.034 0.002 0.023 0.048 -0.077 -0.052 -0.185 1.000       
10 Patents 0.214 0.106 0.152 0.023 0.109 0.042 -0.110 0.153 0.106 1.000      
11 Employees -0.004 0.056 0.037 -0.035 -0.006 0.055 -0.088 0.295 -0.095 0.235 1.000     
12 Sale 0.096 0.111 0.057 -0.018 0.019 0.071 -0.108 0.309 -0.072 0.329 0.720 1.000    
13 Firm age 0.176 0.272 0.104 -0.012 0.029 0.176 0.092 0.471 -0.183 0.189 0.229 0.287 1.000   
14 Cash/ assets 0.156 0.032 0.047 0.032 0.073 -0.127 -0.043 -0.296 0.496 0.038 -0.127 -0.097 -0.264 1.000  
15 Leverage -0.021 -0.036 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.082 0.005 0.175 -0.204 -0.018 0.088 0.042 0.127 -0.376 1.000 





Table 25: Correlation and univariate analysis of independent directors and acquisitions of external 
knowledge 
Panel A: pairwise correlations 
 Buying probability   
     
Ind dir % t 0.165***    
Ind dir % t-1 0.174***    
     
Panel B: univariate analysis 
Share of independent directors quartiles 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
     
Buying probability 0.423 .506+++ 0.600+++ 0.625+ 
     
Note: Panel A reports the correlation between Ind dir % and Buying probability. Panel B reports the mean Buying 
probability for each quartile of firms based on the quartiles from the share of independent directors on the board. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for correlations. +++ p<0.01, ++, p<0.05, + p<0.1 for indicating whether the column’s value 
is statistically different from the previous column’s value. 
 
 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics for the share of independent directors on the board, based on 
quartiles 
Quartiles  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min Max 
      
Q1 3324 0.438 0.124 0 0.571 
Q2 3065     0.659 0.040 0.583 0.714 
Q3 2619     0.775 0.028 0.722    0.818 
Q4 2703      0.877    0.029 0.824           1 





Table 27: Independent directors and acquisitions of external knowledge 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Buying probability 
   
Ind dir % 0.078**  
 (0.035)  
Treated x After_treat  0.054* 
  (0.029) 
Board size 0.006** 0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Ln (R&D/assets) 0.020 0.008 
 (0.082) (0.092) 
Ln(Patents) 0.003 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
Ln(Employees) 0.012 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.025) 
Ln(Sale) 0.018 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.021) 
Ln(Firm age) -0.077* -0.025 
 (0.037) (0.051) 
Ln(Cash/assets) -0.003 -0.053 
 (0.062) (0.084) 
Leverage -0.021 0.019 
 (0.039) (0.050) 
Constant 0.416*** 0.382** 
 (0.131) (0.166) 
   
Observations 9,608 4,986 
R-squared 0.724 0.722 
Number of firms 1,434 1,434 
Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Note: Column (1) in this table presents the results from OLS panel regressions of the probability of engaging in buying 
in markets for technology on the share of independent directors on the board and a number of firm-level control 
variables. Column (2) in this table presents the results from a diff-in-diff panel regressions of the probability of 
engaging in buying in markets for technology on the interaction term between treated firms and the dummy 
After_treat. This interaction represents those firms that transitioned from a non-majority to a majority of independent 
boards in 2001 or later. Both columns include year and firm fixed effects. All the variables are described in Table A1 
in Appendix 2. All the predictors are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 




Table 28: Independent directors and IP acquisitions: moderators related to the intensity of the NIH 
syndrome 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Buying probability 
    
Ind dir % -0.016 0.011 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.061) (0.064) 
Research workforce stability -0.143   
 (0.118)   
Ind dir % x Research workforce stability 0.241   
 (0.158)   
Inventor interactions stability  -0.230  
  (0.151)  
Ind dir % x Inventor interactions stability  0.388*  
  (0.201)  
Inventor team stability   -0.270** 
   (0.129) 
Ind dir % x Inventor team stability   0.311* 
   (0.174) 
Constant 0.595*** 0.631*** 0.591*** 
 (0.191) (0.194) (0.190) 
    
Observations 4,273 4,146 4,273 
R-squared 0.500 0.497 0.501 
Number of firms 654 636 654 
CONTROLS YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the results from OLS panel regressions of the probability of engaging in buying in markets 
for technology on the interactions of the share of independent directors on the board with moderators Research 
workforce stability, Inventor interactions stability, and Inventor team stability, and other firm-level control variables, 
as described in Table A1 in Appendix 2. All the predictors are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors are in 





Table 29: Independent directors and IP acquisitions: moderators related to CEO power 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Buying probability Buying probability 
   
Ind dir % 0.137*** 0.240*** 
 (0.048) (0.077) 
CEO duality 0.054  
 (0.037)  
Ind dir % x CEO duality -0.093*  
 (0.052)  
EINDEX  0.045* 
  (0.023) 
Ind dir % x EINDEX  -0.059* 
  (0.028) 
Constant 0.471*** 0.135 
 (0.138) (0.210) 
   
Observations 9,208 4,460 
R-squared 0.725 0.751 
Number of firms 1,315 1,108 
CONTROLS YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Note: This table presents the results from OLS panel regressions of the probability of engaging in buying in markets 
for technology on the interactions of the share of independent directors on the board with moderators CEO duality and 
EINDEX, and other firm-level control variables, as described in Table A1 in Appendix 2. All the predictors are lagged 







Figure 5: Evolution of fractions of independent directors on the board and independent boards 
over 1999 to 2010 
Note: This figure presents the evolution of independent boards over 1996 to 2010. % Independent directors on the 
board indicates the average ratio of independent directors and the total number of directors of the board (Ind dir %) 
over time. % Independent boards illustrates the percentage of independent boards (whether the board has a majority 





Figure 6: Average Buying probability from 1996 to 2010 for the Treated vs Control firms 
Note: This figure presents the evolution of average Buying probability for Treated versus Control firms over 1996 to 
2010. Treated (control) firms are defined as those that did not (did) comply with the requirement of having a majority 




3.8 APPENDIX 1 
3.8.1 Constructing the Dependent Variable 
Although PAD database from the USPTO has a number of advantages for tracking patent 
transactions over a large period of time, it also entails a major challenge in connecting the data to 
other databases. This is mainly due to the absence of a common firm identifier and the fact that 
the recorded names of the assignees (buyers) and assignors (sellers) have never been standardized. 
Since we are interested in the propensity of buying patents, we standardize the names of the 
assignees, following a similar name standardization procedure to the ones used in Bessen (2009) 
and Arora et al. (2019). We start by transforming all the names to uppercase and dropping general 
words (e.g. THE) or phrases (e.g. PAD assignee names may oftentimes include information on 
potential addresses47; Compustat firms may include endings, such as “-CL A”, “-OLD”, “-NEW”) 
and any punctuation characters. In addition, we standardize common abbreviations, as such 
different “versions” of INDUSTRIES to IND or TECHNOLOGIES to TECH. Similar to the 
“stemming” procedure from the NBER data project, we also drop endings indicating legal entities 
and other common words (e.g., CORP, INC, LTD, IND, etc.), unless the company name is too 
short (for that we conduct some manual checks). Where possible, we standardize certain company 
names by their famous abbreviations, for example, we use IBM for various spelling versions of 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP (see Arora et al., 2019). Overall, these steps 
help us decrease the possibilities of spelling inconsistencies. 
Another procedure we follow for constructing our dependent variable is the following. To 
account for our sample firm historical name and ownership structure changes - Compustat variable 
                                                 




conm gets updated for all the available years once a name change is made48 -, as well as to 
introduce other spelling variations, we make use of two other databases: Arora et al. (2019) and 
Monath & McCallum (2015). Arora et al. (2019) data allows us to connect standardized names to 
parent and subsidiary firms and provides the interval of time corresponding to the specific 
assignee. Monath & McCallum (2015) helps us identify different “names” for the specific 
assignee, via tracking all the patents and the corresponding names these patents were filed with. 
In the end, we are able to create different variations of names for each of our focal firms with 
information about the time range the name was “active”. The goal of all these checks is to ensure 
that we end up considering the transactions from one firm to another, without including cases of 
M&As or cases where the firm appears with different names, but is the same entity. After these 
supplementary checks, we fuzzy match IRRC-Compustat companies with the standardized 
assignee names from PAD and leave only those transactions, the dates of which are within the 
range of the previously identified names49. If for a given year, the focal firm was matched to an 
assignee from PAD, we assign a value of 1 to Buying probability, and 0 otherwise. Given a) the 
fact that we are interested in the probability of engaging in buying transactions, rather than for 
instance, the intensity of doing so (e.g. aggregate number of patents bought from all the 
transactions for a given year), together with b) the fact that on average, a firm in our sample 
engages in more than one transaction over the sample period of time, we believe that it is safe to 
assume that our dependent variable is less subject to concerns of entailing noise due to 
methodological complexity of constructing it. 
  
                                                 
48 Name changes can be due to different reasons: e.g. ownership changes, corporate decisions. 
49 Importantly, although we do try to minimize type I and type II errors when identifying the firms using PAD, we 




3.9 APPENDIX 2 
Table A 1: Variable descriptions 




1 if the firm buys at least one patent in t according to PAD, 0 
otherwise. 
PAD 
Independent variable and moderators 
Ind dir % Proportion of independent directors out of Board size (see below) IRRC 
Treated 1 if the firm was not compliant (did not have a majority of 
independent directors prior to SOX), 0 otherwise.  
IRRC 
After_treat 1 if the year is after the year when the firm switched from a non-





Proportion of the number of firm’s inventors that patented in t-1 
or/and t-2 out of the number of the firm’s current inventors 
patenting in t. 





Average proportion of the firm’s inventors’ interactions, which 
are identified at the inventor level, as the ratio between the 
number of co-inventors with whom each inventor patented in t-
1or/and t-2 and those inventors’ total number of co-inventors in t. 




Proportion of the number of teams that patented in t-1 or/and t-2 
out of the total number of teams that patented in t. 
Arora et al. (2019); 
www.patentsview.org 
CEO duality 1 if the CEO acts also as the Chairman of the board, 0 otherwise Execucomp 
EINDEX Entrenchment Index: Number of the corporate governance 
provisions in place (golden parachute, poison pill, classified 
board, supermajority vote, limited charter amendment, limited 
bylaws amendment). See Bebchuk et al. (2009).  
IRRC 
Control variables 
Board size Number of directors on the board IRRC 
Ln(R&D/assets) Natural logarithm of one plus R&D expenses over lagged total 
assets 
Compustat 
Ln(Patents) Natural logarithm of the number of patents, according to Arora et 
al. (2019) 
Arora et al. (2019) 
Ln(Employees) Natural logarithm of the number of employees (in thousands) Compustat 
Ln(Sale) Natural logarithm of sales Compustat 
Ln(Firm age) Natural logarithm of the years since the firm’s first inclusion in 
Compustat 
Compustat 
Ln(Cash/assets) Natural logarithm of cash over total assets Compustat 
Leverage Long-term debt over total assets Compustat 
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